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Abstract 
This study contains two chapters. The first uses the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer 
proportional hazard model with individual heterogeneity to investigate the effects of loss 
aversion concerning the housing market and the local foreclosure rate on retirement during the 
housing bust periods. The second chapter creates a dynamic programming life-cycle model with 
the housing wealth and uses the Method of Simulated Moments to systematically study the 
retirement and saving behavior during the housing boom and bust (the years 2000-2014). 
Housing wealth is one of the biggest savings for elderly. It relates to the financial security 
of elderly after retirement. After the incredible growth of housing prices in the early 2000s, the 
housing market melted down at the end of the year 2007. A tremendous decline in property value 
caused a high uncertainty about the housing market. Even though elderly were not sure how 
severe the housing bust would be, they knew the highest value of home equity before the Great 
Recession. In the first chapter, we use this highest value at the year 2006 to measure the loss 
aversion concerning housing wealth. Higher housing equity at the year 2006 might experience 
more loss in the Great Recession. When there was a loss of housing wealth, it increased the 
uncertainty of financial resources in the future. Delaying retirement and working more years to 
increase savings are a reasonable plan to improve resources.  
For the same amount of housing wealth loss, the effect is not the same if elderly live in a 
different area and a different housing market. The expectation of housing market performance is 
also not the same. We have high-quality data on local foreclosure rates from Equifax. It provides 
the number of foreclosures starting in the first week of July from year 2005 to 2012 on the zip-
code level. We use the local foreclosure rate to approximate the expectation of the local housing 
market. Coefficients of both home equity at the year 2006 and local foreclosure rate (except the 
 
 
year 2009) are significant and negative, meaning elderly with higher home equity at the year 
2006 and elderly who live in an area with a higher foreclosure rate significantly delay their 
retirement.  
 In the second chapter, we create a dynamic programming life-cycle model based on 
French and Jones (2011). We still take into account the risks of wage, health status, mortality and 
medical cost in our models. Because we study the elderly after the year 2000, the ‘Senior 
Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000’ that eliminates the Social Security earnings test after 
normal retirement age is applied. We use the re-entry state variable to control the labor force 
participation when there is no Social Security earnings test.  
New models separate the housing wealth from total wealth in the original model and 
consider the housing wealth through two constraints: the baseline model has an unknown 
proportional housing wealth in the asset accumulation equation; the modified model has a home 
equity borrowing constraint. New models also take into account housing wealth change in the 
bequest motive component.  
Both the baseline and modified models match the labor-force participation well and 
capture the high exit rate at the Medicare age. The coefficient of unknown proportional housing 
wealth in the baseline model indicates that elderly takes into account approximately 25 percent 
of their housing wealth in the asset accumulation, which, coincidently, is close to the average 
ratio of loan to value in the data. The modified model matches better than the baseline model in 
the asset quantile moments (saving behavior). Robust checks show the bequest coefficients 
significantly change if we do not separate housing wealth from total wealth. Surprisingly, change 
of bequest curvature is close to the mean of the housing wealth.  
 
 
Three experiments are conducted in the second chapter. We experiment with two 
different housing wealth projections and one tighter borrowing constraint. The results indicate 
that loss of housing wealth and tight borrowing constraints delay retirement. Even though we use 
the long-term growth rate and obtain a similar mean of labor-force participation rate, the curves 
significantly shift to adjust the new expectation of housing wealth change. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Assessing how earnings, employer-provided pensions, and individual assets 
contribute to retirement income and wealth accumulation requires an understanding of how 
these sources of retirement income affect the retirement decisions of older workers.1 
Economists use duration analysis to estimate the effect of the socio-economic characteristics 
on the conditional probability of retirement (see, for example, Diamond and Hausman 1984; 
Gustman and Steinmeier 1986 and 2000; and Hurd 1990). However, an accurate assessment 
also requires an understanding of how the levels and future expectations of the different 
sources of retirement income have changed in the last several years.  
The U.S. economy has experienced two major recessions in the last two decades. The 
first of these started in late 2000 following the Tech Bust. Firms laid off millions of employees 
as profits fell. While employment outcomes for older workers in fact remained favorable during 
the recession and recovery (see Munnell, Sass, Soto and Zhivan 2006; and Cooper 2008), the 
recession brought substantial declines in the value of their defined contribution plans and other 
non-housing equity assets. The S&P 500 index fell in 2003 to a value last seen in 1997. It had 
passed the 1500 benchmark in the year 2000 but next attained that level only in 2007. The 
declines in retirement assets led to delays in the decision to retire (see Cooper 2008). 
Unlike the Tech Bust, the Housing Bust of 2007 brought with it not only a decline in 
financial asset values but also a decline in property values unprecedented in recent decades. By 
April 2008 equities were off 15.5 percent from their October 2007 highs, while housing prices 
                                                          
1 Retirement can mean Social Security claiming age, self-reported retirement, or full or partial retirement (see Gustman and 
Steinmeier 2002). The econometric analysis below will be performed for a self-reported retirement definition. 
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were down by 10 percent or more nationally from the preceding year. By 2009 the Housing Bust 
had not only caused a decline in home values of 28 percent in the United States (see Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009), it had also increased the uncertainty about the current and future values of a 
particular home. In a March 18, 2013 interview with the Daily Ticker, Robert Shiller of Yale 
University says “the future of the housing market is a great unknown.” (See also Nakamura 
2010.) Case, Shiller, and Thompson (2012) find that respondents in their survey seem to have a 
much unclear picture when the housing market is ambiguous. Short-run expectations are 
underreacted to the year-to-year changes in actual home prices. Older workers consider their 
home to be both a place to live in retirement and a store of wealth for bequests or in case of 
emergency. Anecdotal evidence (see, for example Levitz 2008) suggests that the general declines 
in home values that started in 2007 and the uncertainty about the value of housing delays the 
retirement of these workers. Older workers will want to work longer to accumulate additional 
wealth to replace lost housing value. 
We use both the Prentice-Gloeckler or complementary log-log proportional hazard model 
(see Prentice and Gloeckler 1978) and the heterogeneity-corrected Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer 
proportional hazard model (see Meyer 1990) to estimate the determinants of the time to first self-
reported retirement of married males.2 Restricting the sample to married males reduces 
heterogeneity due to including single males who are not involved in joint decision-making. By 
including a dummy indicating the retirement status of the female spouse in the covariate list of 
the male spouse, the estimated model takes into account coincidence in tastes for leisure, since 
                                                          
2 The focus on first retirement excludes subsequent retirement after a re-entry into the labor force, the timing of which may have 
different determinants. 
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each spouse’s utility depends on the retirement status of the other (see Gustman and Steinmeier 
2000; and Hurd 1990).   
 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) waves from 1992 through 2012 provide the 
data for the estimation. Demographic data and data on income, pensions, and housing and non- 
housing financial wealth form the basis of the covariate list. We use the restricted Social Security 
Administration data to obtain the zip code of the household’s primary residence, which is then tied to 
the percentage of foreclosures started in the month of July for years after the Housing Bust, obtained 
from Equifax Credit Trends 4.0,. This local percentage of foreclosures is included as a hazard 
covariate. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 constitutes the literature 
review, while section 3 presents the econometric theory. Section 4 describes the data in greater 
detail. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
Literature Review 
Work by Diamond and Hausman (1984) is among the first important studies to examine 
the determinants of the retirement behavior of older men. They suggest that individual 
uncertainty concerning wealth accumulation, financial needs, health and job opportunities should 
be a central focus in using longitudinal data for this purpose. The statistical specification used by 
Diamond and Hausman is a Weibull duration model with a Gamma random effect, introduced 
into the economic literature by Lancaster 1979, to control for unobserved determinants of 
retirement.  
There are distinct advantages to using a duration model instead of other statistical 
methods to study retirement. First, in most longitudinal data there will be a degree of censoring 
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(the respondent will not have retired by the end of the sample period), which can easily be 
incorporated into the likelihood function for duration. Second, the fact that relevant regressors 
are likely to change over time can be handled in a straightforward manner in a hazard analysis.  
Diamond and Hausman find that both private pensions and Social Security have strong 
positive effects on the retirement hazard of older men. The Social Security effect is strong when 
benefits first become available at age 62 and rises for workers over 62. Bad health has a 
significantly positive effect on the retirement hazard at all ages, no matter what financial 
incentives or disincentives are provided by private pensions and Social Security. They find little 
effect for variables related to education and marital status. At least in part, this may be due to the 
way these variables were specified. The highest degree attained was not controlled for directly; 
nor was the work status of a spouse. In the latter case, a spouse who works may provide 
additional financial security, at least until her retirement. Conversely, a spouse who has never 
worked or has previously retired (or is about to retire) may enhance the utility of retirement, 
since the additional leisure can be shared with a partner with similar interests. This reasoning 
clearly suggests a need to consider the joint retirement decision of the husband and the wife. 
Perhaps the first important work concerning the joint retirement decision of married 
couples is by Hurd (1990). Hurd seeks to determine whether husbands and wives tend to retire 
the same time, and if so to provide an explanation for this tendency. He finds evidence of the co-
ordination of retirement dates, both through preliminary analysis of the data as well as economic 
modeling. Hurd hypothesizes that the closeness of retirement dates could be due to either 
similarity of tastes caused by assortative mating, by economic variables, or by complementarity 
of leisure. He claims that each potential explanation has different implications for the response of 
retirement to policy changes. According to his empirical results, economic variables appear to 
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explain very little of the closeness of retirement dates. He also rules out assortative mating as a 
potential explanation. The only hypothesis left is the complementarity of leisure. Unfortunately, 
Hurd feels that data limitations leave him with only a qualitative result. Hurd’s methodology 
does not involve duration modeling. 
Over the last 25 years two sets of researchers, working independently, have made 
significant contributions to the theory and empirical analysis of retirement behavior.  
Gustman and Steinmeier focus on structural modeling and have relied primarily on the 
HRS for their data. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) estimate a structural model of retirement 
choice that interacts lifetime preferences and incentives. Their results track actual retirement 
behavior closely, including peaks in the retirement rate at ages 62 and 65.  
Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) develop a structural model of the joint retirement 
decision of married couples and estimate this model using panel data from the NLS for Mature 
Women. In the model utility depends on family lifetime consumption, the separate labor supply 
of the husband and the wife, as well as the age and health of each. The value that each spouse 
places on leisure is influenced by the retirement status of the other spouse. Because people who 
share the same tastes are more likely to marry, the retirement preferences of the husband and 
wife may be correlated. The husband and wife choose paths of consumption, work, and ultimate 
retirement that maximize their preferences over a time subject to the restriction that lifetime 
family consumption cannot exceed lifetime family income. As individuals age, the value of 
retirement eventually outweighs the value of wages, and the individuals retire. 
Gustman and Steinmeier find strong evidence for the hypothesis that husbands and wives 
tend to retire together despite the younger ages of wives. Their estimation suggests that one 
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reason for coordinated retirement is a coincidence of tastes for leisure. They also find that 
spouses generally, but husbands in particular, value retirement more if their partner has already 
retired. Gustman and Steinmeier’s modeling of the opportunity set accounts for peaks in the 
retirement hazard of each spouse; however, they find that the co-ordination of opportunities is 
not responsible for the co-ordination of retirement dates. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) use data from the HRS to gauge respondents’ knowledge 
about future Social Security and pension benefits by comparing respondent reports of their 
expected benefits with benefits calculated from Social Security earnings records and employer 
provided descriptions of pension plans. Their results suggest general misinformation, 
imprecision and lack of information about retirement benefits is the norm.  
Gustman and Steinmeier (2003) construct a structural dynamic stochastic model of the 
way individuals make retirement and saving choices in an uncertain world and use it to analyze 
the effects of the stock market bubble on retirement behavior. The model includes individual 
variation both in retirement preferences and in time preferences. Estimates are based on 
information covering the period 1992 through 2000 from the HRS. The high stock market returns 
in the second half of the 1990's increased retirement rates for the HRS sample of workers by over 
3 percentage points and would have decreased the average retirement age by about a quarter of a 
year if it had not been interrupted. The subsequent decline in the market neutralized the effect on 
retirement of the preceding stock market gains. Gustman and Steinmeier speculate in their paper 
that any continuing effects of the bubble after its end would probably be minimal. 
More recent research by Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) addresses the topic of whether 
jointly modeling the retirement behavior of two-earner couples brings with it any advantages 
over modeling the retirement behavior of the two earners separately. Although the type of 
7 
 
 
 
models used by Gustman and Steinmeier is different from the one that we use in this study and 
their focus is different from ours, their results are relevant to the present study since we model 
only the retirement decision of the male spouse. Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) estimate 
structural models of saving and retirement behavior in the face of two policies, the effects of 
which are known a priori. The findings of the study suggest that joint modeling and separate 
modeling give roughly the same results. 
The work by David Blau primarily uses the Retirement History Survey. Blau (1994) 
examines movements of older men through labor force states using quarterly observations from 
the Retirement History Survey. He compares these transitions with those from the more typical 
biannual records and uncovers substantial under-counts in the biannual data. He concludes that 
the prevalence of labor force movements at older ages has been previously under-estimated. Blau 
has also studied the retirement behavior of married couples. Under the “dependent’s benefits” 
provision of Social Security a female spouse is eligible for a spousal benefit equal to 50 percent 
of her husband's benefits if she chooses not to receive a retired worker benefit based on her own 
earnings record. Blau (1997) uses data from the Retirement History Survey to show that the 
spousal benefit provision has a small negative impact on labor force participation of older female 
spouses and a small positive impact on the labor force participation of older married men.  
Blau (1998) analyzes the dynamics of the joint labor force dynamics of older couples in 
the United States. Using data from the Retirement History Survey, he finds strong associations 
between the labor force transition probabilities of one spouse and the labor force status of the 
other. Blau and Riphahn (1999) use monthly observations from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) to model the labor force behavior of older married couples in Germany. They 
estimate a discrete-time competing-risks hazard model of transitions among labor force states 
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that are defined by the employment status of both spouses. Their empirical results suggest, 
broadly speaking, that spouses are more likely to move towards states in which both are 
employed or in which both are not employed. 
The focus of the present study is the effect of financial wealth and housing equity wealth 
on the retirement decision. One important study in this regard is by Case, Quigley, and Schiller 
(2005). Case, Quigley, and Schiller examine the links between increases in housing wealth, 
financial wealth, and consumer spending. They draw on annual data from 14 countries and 
quarterly state-level data from the United States to estimate regression models in levels, first 
differences and in error-correction form relating consumption to income and wealth measures. 
Case, Quigley, and Schiller find a large, statistically significant effect of housing wealth on 
household consumption. 
Using cross-MSA variation in house-price movements in data provided by the Office of 
Housing Enterprise Oversight, Farnham and Sevak (2007) find evidence that changes in housing 
wealth affect retirement timing for a sample of older workers from the HRS. They also find 
evidence that housing-wealth shocks affect retirement expectations as well as present retirement 
rates. They estimate that a 10 percent increase in housing wealth is associated with a reduction in 
expected retirement age of between three and a half and five months. 
Finally, three important recent studies examine the employment status and retirement 
expectations of older U. S. workers in the wake of the recent recession, topics which are clearly 
closely related to the focus of the present study. Copeland (2010) uses the March Current 
Population Survey to examine how employment rates of workers aged 55 and older changed over 
the period from 1987 to 2008. Copeland finds that the percentage of older workers working full-
time throughout the year increased steadily from 1993 to 2007 before decreasing during the 
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recession year of 2008. Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2010) use the HRS to investigate the 
relationship between stock market performance and retirement plans over the 1998 to 2008 
period. The authors find a statistically significant negative relationship between the probability 
of working full-time at age 62 and the value of the S&P 500 index toward the end of their study 
period. They do not, however, find strong evidence that changes in equity markets influence 
changes in retirement plans over the period as a whole. They conclude that the higher 
probabilities of working in recent years may be related to factors other than stock market 
performance, such as pessimism about economic security. Unlike in previous recessions, layoffs 
for older workers became a fact of life with the recession that started in 2007. Gustman, 
Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2011) report that the percentage of retirement-age workers who were 
not retired at the start of the 2000-2001 Recession and were both not working and not retired 
four years later was 6.2 percent, while the comparable percentage of workers not retired in 2006 
(one year before the Housing Bust) who were both not working and not retired four years later 
was 11.7 percent, an increase of 4.5 percent. 
Hazard Estimation 
We define age at retirement as the age at the first self-report of retirement for the sample 
of work-able married males drawn from the 1992 through 2012 waves of the HRS. A continuous 
work histories constructed starting at age 59 can each be stopped in five ways: first, after a self-
reported retirement; second, after the last wave; third, before a non-response for the retirement 
question; fourth, before a wave in which the marriage ends; and fifth, before a wave in which the 
male spouse is reported to be disabled. Our goal is to find the determinants of the conditional 
retirement rate (retirement hazard rate) and to investigate how the determinants change after the 
Housing Bust. Note that the retirement rate might be thought of as the retirement rate at a point 
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in time within the calendar year or as the retirement rate for a given year. In most cases the 
meaning should be clear from the context. 
Suppose that a given sample is composed of N work histories. The N work histories 
provide information on N independent individual retirement ages. Let iT , a continuous variable, 
be the retirement age for individuals 1, . . . ,i N . The hazard rate for individual i  takes the 
proportional hazard form developed by Cox (1972): 
 0( ) ( )exp( ( ) ) ,i it t z t                               (1) 
where 0 ( )t  is the unknown baseline hazard at time t , ( )iz t  is the vector of time-varying 
covariates, and   is the coefficient vector. 
To estimate the coefficient vector, we use the technique proposed by Prentice and 
Gloeckler (1978) as well as the adaptation of Meyer (1990) that allows controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the Prentice-Gloeckler technique the parameters 0 ( )t  
 of the log-integrated 
baseline hazard are non-parametrically estimated simultaneously with the coefficient vector. The 
estimation method does not use the continuous quality of the duration variable, but rather 
discretizes this variable into time intervals (in our study we use annual intervals). The Prentice-
Gloeckler technique uses the extreme-value distribution function to estimate the conditional 
survivor function at age 1t  : 
   'Pr 1| exp( exp( ( ) ( )))),i i iT t T t z t t         (2) 
11 
 
 
 
where the covariate vector ( )iz t  is assumed to remain constant over the period from t  to 1t  . 
(This type of estimation is called “grouped” or “interval-censored”.) Generally, when the 
Prentice-Gloeckler technique is used, a   parameter is estimated for each interval. 
The interpretation of parameters is an important component of the estimation procedure. 
The   coefficients in the Prentice-Gloeckler likelihood have an interpretation similar to that of 
the regression coefficients in a log-linear or semi-log regression model. In a log-linear model 
where both the dependent variables and regressors are logged, a regression coefficient can be 
interpreted as an elasticity. Similarly, if a regressor is logged in the Prentice-Gloeckler 
likelihood, its coefficient can be interpreted as a hazard elasticity. In a semi-log regression in 
which the dependent variable is logged but the regressors are not, the elasticity of the dependent 
variable with respect to a regressor is given by the value the regressor times the coefficient. 
Similarly, if a regressor is not logged in a Prentice-Gloeckler likelihood, its hazard elasticity is 
given by the value the regressor times the coefficient. 
The theoretical contribution of Meyer (1990) is to use random effects to incorporate 
unobserved heterogeneity into the Prentice-Gloeckler likelihood. The resulting likelihood is now 
called the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer likelihood. The random effect summarizes the effects of all 
(unobserved) excluded regressors that are constant over the work lifetime and orthogonal to 
included regressors. It is well known that failure to control for such unobserved heterogeneity 
will result in inconsistent parameter estimates. 
Incorporating the multiplicative random effect   into the hazard results in 
 '0( ) ( ) exp( ( ) )i i it t z t      (3) 
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Meyer (1990) assumes that the random effects i  
are independent of the ( )iz t  
and are i.i.d. 
Gamma variates with mean one and variance 
2 . 
Note that when i  
equals one, the value of the hazard is the same as that in the Prentice-
Gloeckler likelihood. This means that conditional on the random affect assuming its mean value, 
the regressor coefficients have the same interpretation in both likelihoods. The Prentice-
Gloeckler-Meyer technique estimates the survivor function at age 1t   using the following 
probability: 
  
2
2 '
0
Pr 1 1 exp( ( ) ( ))
t
i i
k
T t z k k

  


 
     
 
   (4) 
The variance 2  must now be estimated together with the coefficient vector   and the ( )t ’s. 
Testing the significance of the estimate of 2  is complicated by the fact that zero is on the edge 
of the parameter space. Under these conditions the appropriate critical value for a test of size   
is the critical value for a test of size 2  under standard conditions. Finally, note that when i  
equals one, the value of the hazard is the same in equations (1) and (3). This means that, 
conditional on the random effect assuming its mean value, the regressor coefficients and hazard 
ratios have the same interpretation in the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer likelihood as in the Prentice-
Gloeckler likelihood. 
In the work below, we use the formula from Follain, Ondrich, and Sinha (1997) to 
examine the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer annual hazards at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the 
local foreclosure rate for three specific cohorts. Individuals in the first cohort reach age 65 
(normal retirement age) in the year 2007; individuals in the second cohort reach age 62 (early 
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retirement age) in 2007 and 65 in 2010; and individuals in the final cohort reach age 62 in 2010. 
The functional form of the annual hazard is:   
 
2
2
2
1 ( )
( ) 1
1 ( 1)
i
t
i
g t
h t
g t




 
   
  
  (5) 
where '
0
( ) exp( ( ) ( ) )
t
i i
s
g t t z t 

   and ( 1) 0ig   . For this analysis indicator variables and 
control variables are assigned age-specific means. 
The Data 
The empirical analysis used in this study comes from the HRS, originally a longitudinal 
survey of a nationally representative sample of the U.S. population 51 to 61 years old in 1992. In 
1998 the sample membership of the HRS increases in size when it merges with the Asset and 
Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey and two new special cohorts are 
added, the Children of the Depression Era (CODA), born in the period 1924-30 and War Babies 
(WB), born in 1942-47. Since 1998 new sample members are added every six years: Early Baby 
Boomers (EBB) are added in 2004, and Mid Baby Boomers (MBB) are added in 2010.  
As discussed previously, a continuous work history is constructed for each sample 
individual starting at age 59. Each history can be stopped in six circumstances: first, after a self-
reported retirement; second, after the last wave of the HRS; third, before a non-response for the 
retirement question; fourth, before a wave in which the marriage has ended; fifth, before a wave 
in which the male spouse is reported to be disabled; and sixth, before a year in which the male’s 
stated retirement date conflicts with previous wave statements of work. Work histories are not 
included in the sample if either the husband or his wife is disabled before 1991, the first year of 
the HRS. These restrictions on the disability-ability status of the spouse(s) help guarantee that a 
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retirement decision is made freely and is not forced on the household by functional limitations. 
After additionally dropping a handful of work histories because of missing data that cannot be 
filled in any reasonable way, the number of work histories becomes 3,293. These 3,293 work 
histories provide a total of 14,454 person-years to the present study. 
The estimation uses six types of variables. The first type is demographic variables. The 
HRS 2010 Tracker file provides the time-invariant demographic variables, while the HRS Core 
provides the time-varying demographic variables. There are two race indicators, one for if the 
male spouse is African-American and the second for if the male spouse is non-White and non-
African-American. There is an indicator for whether the male spouse has a college degree and 
another for whether he reports that he is in good health. Included in the list of demographic 
variables are four variables that describe the female spouse. Three of them are indicator 
variables, one for whether the female spouse is disabled, one for whether the female spouse is 
retired, and one for whether the female spouse has been a nonworking homemaker. The final 
variable of the demographic type is meant to capture the effect of the Social Security spousal 
benefit on retirement behavior. The spousal benefit will be larger if the principal breadwinner, 
typically the male spouse, waits until the Social Security full retirement age before he retires. 
The effect of the Social Security spousal benefit is more likely to come into play when the 
female spouse is a homemaker. Therefore, the final variable of the demographic type gives the 
number of years to the male spouse’s Social Security full retirement age when the female spouse 
is a homemaker. The variable is zero otherwise. 
There are seven workplace variables. These variables, as well as all financial and housing 
wealth values, come from the Rand HRS Data Set, Version P and the Rand HRS Income and 
Wealth Imputations. The first variable is the real annual log income of the female spouse, and the 
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second is the real annual log income of the male spouse. (All deflated nominal values used in this 
study have been deflated by the implicit GDP deflator for personal consumption expenditures 
(year 2005=100) constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.) Although we did not feel 
that we could get accurate information on employment-related pension plans, we did create three 
indicators for the type of pension plan. The first indicator is for whether the male spouse has ever 
had a defined benefit plan; the second is an indicator for whether the male spouse has not had a 
defined benefit plan but has had a defined contribution plan; and the third is an indicator for 
whether the male spouse has both a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan. Finally, 
we use restricted HRS data on three-digit occupation codes for the respondents to create three 
occupation categories: manager/professional, office worker (including technical and sales staff), 
and blue-collar. The first two indicators are included in the regressions and blue-collar is the 
reference category. 
We experimented with three housing variables in preliminary estimations. The first is the 
log of the real home value, set to zero when the household does not own its own home. The 
second variable is the log of the real value of the sum of mortgage and home loans. Both of these 
variables had significant coefficients with the correct sign in virtually all of the estimations in 
which they were used, although none of these results are presented here. The final variable is the 
real value of home equity, real home value minus real mortgage value, in millions of dollars. 
The HRS is a biannual survey, although in a few cases it may interview households three 
years apart. The present work constructs annual work histories until 2012 from the HRS. We use 
the 12th (2014) wave to correct self-report errors. 
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One of the unique features of our preferred results is that we do not impute home equity 
after 2006 based on a trend for the individual household, nor do we rely on the household’s own 
assessment of home equity over the Great Recession years.  
Even in cases where a household reports a value for home equity during the Great 
Recession, it is likely that the household is less certain about this value compared to values in 
previous years because of the nature of the substantial decline in housing demand. It is clear 
from the high foreclosure rates that the ownership of many homes reverted to the lending 
institutions. In order to stay liquid, these institutions sold these properties at greatly reduced 
prices. The extent to which the outcomes of such sales were made public is debatable, since 
municipalities had an incentive to “hide” such sales to protect their tax base. As a result, unless a 
household attempted to sell its home, which fewer households did, it is unlikely that it would feel 
confident about its assessment of its home equity.  
Nor does it seem to be appropriate to use a value from a general house price index to 
construct home equity, which can be accomplished with the HRS by combining the county 
information from the restricted HRS geography data with the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
MSA-level Repeat Sales House Price Index to impute home prices across the Great Recession 
years. It seems likely that the decline of mean home values is smaller than the FHFA Housing 
Price Index (HPI) during the Great Recession. Silva, Eren, Heiland and Martin (2010) find the 
self reported home value in the HRS is approximately 10 percent higher than the final selling 
price over the period 1994-2008. We suspect that this number is likely to have increased over the 
period 2007-2012 because of the fall in the demand for homes.  
On the other hand, households are likely to know their peak home value preceding the 
Housing Bust. Because municipalities have an incentive to keep assessments high, households 
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are likely to know these peak home values. Moreover, many households may have believed that 
these peak values were the true long-run values. Accordingly, over the Great Recession years, 
we use the 2006 value reported by households as the basis for the calculation of home equity. In 
our estimation we allow the effects of the other financial variables to change during the Great 
Recession as well. We use two forms of local (zip-code level) foreclosure rate in our estimation: 
first, the foreclosure rate for years after 2006; and second, the same foreclosure rate with the 
effect for year 2009 zeroed out (the local foreclosure rate value for the year 2009 is replaced by 
zero). For both forms of the foreclosure rate variable, effects for the year 2007 are zeroed out 
outside Florida, California, Arizona, the Northeast and Midwest Census regions.  
We experiment with several financial wealth variables, based for the most part on real 
non-housing wealth. Several variants use a two-part linear spline. The estimation presented in 
this study has an unexpected sign for real non-housing wealth in the period preceding the Great 
Recession. However, a spline with a knot at the median value of real non-housing wealth has an 
expected sign for the lower part of the spline (lower values of real non-housing wealth) and an 
unexpected sign only for the upper part of the spline (the same is true of the home equity spline). 
We conjecture that the wealthiest individuals have jobs from which they do not want to retire is 
not entirely unreasonable. 
Since 2000 there is no longer an earnings test for Social Security for workers who retire 
at or above the Social Security full retirement age (normal retirement age). By allowing these 
individuals to work without actuarial penalty after previously collecting Social Security, the 
average probability of an initial retirement at or after normal retirement age should have 
increased. Accordingly, we include a variable interacting a post-1999 year with the male being of 
normal retirement age.  
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The final type of variable is the age-indicator variable. Together the age-indicator 
variables allow a flexible baseline for the proportional hazard estimation. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Results 
Figure 1 presents married male annual retirement rates for both early and normal 
retirement ages over the period 1994-2012. Normal retirement rates show a steady decline before 
the 2008. It falls from 14.6 percent to 9.3 percent at the 2008. Although it bumps up and down 
during the Great Recession, normal retirement rates are below the 2006 level. Early retirement 
rates substantially fall over the period 2001-2004 from 19.5 percent to its lowest 10.2 percent. It 
remains the 2 percentage points of 15 percent after the 2006. Both series show a clear reverse at 
the 2009 in which the housing market is far away from the recovery. Older men who might have 
delayed retirement past 2009 because of the effect of a recessionary economy on personal wealth 
become more optimistic. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes 
a broad spectrum of spending and tax cuts, provides a strong fiscal stimulus. The unemployment 
rate begins to fall, and the growth rate of GDP stops decreasing, even though housing price 
continues to decline.  
The continued decline in the retirement rate after 2000 may be due to the elimination of 
earnings test and a generous adjustment of delaying Social Security benefits. Song and Joyce 
Manchester (2007) argue that increases in work participation aged 65-69 after the suspension of 
the Social Security earnings test are attributable to older workers continuing to work rather than 
inducing older workers back into the workforce. David M. Blau and Ryan M. Goodstein (2010) 
find that increases in the Normal Retirement Age and the Delayed Retirement Credit explain one 
quarter to one half of the recent increases in the labor force participation rate (their data span 
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1962 to 2005, source: CPS, SIPP, SSA). Moreover, Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier 
(2009) alter the budget constraint in the structural model and find that approximately one-sixth of 
the increase in labor force participation in Health and Retirement Study between 1998 and 2004 
for married men aged 65 to 67 is due to evolving Social Security policies.  
[Insert Tables 1 through 5 here] 
Definitions for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1 and their 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. The results of seven models are given in 
Tables 3 through 5, while calculation of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) for these models are presented in Table 6. The degree of financial 
uncertainty that starts with the Great Recession is modeled through a structural break in 2007 for 
variables related to housing and non-housing financial wealth. 
Whether or not married households use the pre-Recession value of their home (equity) as 
a reference point (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is a debatable question. The level of 
uncertainty about house prices undoubtedly increased during the Great Recession. Many homes 
remained in a state of limbo between a homeowner who abandoned it and a bank that did not 
want to be held liable for the property taxes. Municipal governments treated the sales of 
foreclosed homes differently than other sales to protect a tax base inflated by housing boom 
prices. If municipal governments officially acknowledge housing price declines, tax revenues 
decline. On the other hand, if these governments maintain that housing prices did not decline 
locally since the peak of the housing boom, tax revenues remain unaffected. To the extent that 
assessments in many cases continue at peak or close to peak values during the Great Recession, 
the argument that the peak values may become reference points seems to be somewhat   
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Figure 1: 
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Table 1   
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Demographic Variables 
 
Black African-American indicator for male spouse (1=yes). 
Other Race Non-White, Non- African-American indicator for male spouse 
(1=yes). 
College College degree indicator for male spouse (1=yes). 
Health Good Indicator for report of good health for male spouse (1=yes). 
Spouse Disabled Indicator for disabled female spouse (1=yes). 
Spouse Retired Indicator for retired female spouse (1=yes). 
Spouse Homemaker Indicator for female spouse always non-working homemaker 
(1=yes). 
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off Number of years until normal retirement age of male spouse if 
female spouse always non-working homemaker and zero 
otherwise.  
Workplace Variables  
Log Spouse Income Log of female spouse’s real annual earnings ($) in year. 
Log Own Income Log of male spouse’s real annual earnings ($) in year. 
Defined Benefit Plan Indicator for whether male spouse has defined benefit plan 
(1=yes). 
Defined Contribution Plan Indicator for whether male spouse has no defined benefit plan but 
has defined contribution plan (1=yes). 
Both Types of Plan 
 
Manager or Professional 
 
Office Worker 
Indicator for whether male spouse has both defined benefit plan 
and defined contribution plan (1=yes). 
Indicator for whether male has managerial or professional 
occupation(1=yes) 
Indicator for whether male is office worker(1=yes) 
Housing Variables  
Home Equity Spline Part 1 Part 1 of spline for real value of home equity ($ million).Variable 
equals zero if not homeowner. 
Home Equity Spline Part 2 Part 2 of spline for real value of home equity ($ million).Variable 
equals zero if not homeowner. 
Log Mortgage 
Ownership 
Real value of total home loans. 
Indicator for whether male is home owner(1=yes) 
  
Financial Variables  
Financial Assets Spline Part 1 
 
Part 1 of spline for real value of non-housing wealth ($ million). 
Financial Assets Spline Part 2. Part 2 of spline for real value of non-housing wealth ($ million).. 
   
Post – 1999 Indicator Indicator for whether the year is after 1999 (1=yes). 
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Table 1   
Variable Definitions 
(cont’d) 
 
Variable Definition 
Great Recession Variables  
Home Equity 2006  Real value of home equity ($ million) interacted with Great 
Recession. 
Foreclosures Started July 20xx  
x Ownership 
 
Foreclosure Started July 2009 
x Ownership 
Percent of homes in zip code with foreclosures started in July 
2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 or 2012 interacted with ownership; = 0 
in other years.  
Percent of homes in zip code with foreclosures started in July 
2009 interacted with ownership; =0 in other years. 
Defined Benefit Plan 
x Great Recession 
Indicator for whether male spouse has defined benefit plan 
(1=yes) ) interacted with Great Recession. 
Defined Contribution Plan 
x Great Recession 
Indicator for whether male spouse has no defined benefit plan 
but has defined contribution plan (1=yes) interacted with Great 
Recession. 
Both Types of Plan 
x Great Recession 
 
Financial Assets x Great 
Recession 
Manager or Professional 
x Great Recession 
Office Worker 
x Great Recession 
Ownership x Great Recession 
Indicator for whether male spouse has both defined benefit plan 
and defined contribution plan (1=yes). ) interacted with Great 
Recession. 
Real value of financial assets ($ million) interacted with Great 
Recession. 
Managerial or professional occupation (1=yes) interacted with 
Great Recession. 
Office Worker (1=yes) interacted with Great Recession. 
 
Indicator of home owners (1=yes) interacted with Great 
Recession. 
 
Age Indicators 
 
Age xx Indicator for whether male spouse is age xx in year (1=yes). The 
values for xx run from 59 through to 70. 
Age 71-78 Indicator for whether male spouse is between the ages of 71 and 
78 in year (1=yes).  
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Table 2.  Variable Means 
  All Years 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
   
Demographic Variables 
  
Black 0.095 0.294 
Other Race 0.057 0.233 
College  0.315 0.464 
Health Good 0.854 0.353 
Spouse Disabled 0.071 0.256 
Spouse Retired 0.115 0.319 
Spouse Homemaker 0.242 0.428 
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off 0.128 0.805 
   
Workplace Variables   
Log Spouse Income 5.940 4.782 
Log Own Income 8.634 4.110 
Defined Benefit Plan 0.135 0.341 
Defined Contribution Plan 0.436 0.496 
Both Types of Plan 
Manager/Professional 
Office Worker 
0.084 
0.345 
0.184 
0.277 
0.475 
0.388 
   
Housing Variables   
Home Equity 
Ownership 
0.150 
0.920 
0.387 
0.271 
   
Financial Variables   
Financial Assets 0.388 1.353 
   
Post – 1999 Indicator  0.643 0.480 
   
Age Indicators   
Age 59 0.207 0.405 
Age 60 0.175 0.380 
Age 61 0.146 0.353 
Age 62 0.123 0.328 
Age 63 0.086 0.280 
Age 64 0.065 0.246 
Age 65 0.051 0.220 
Age 66 0.036 0.187 
Age 67 0.026 0.159 
Age 68 0.020 0.141 
Age 69 0.017 0.128 
Age 70 0.013 0.114 
Age 71-78 0.035 0.183 
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TABLE 3 
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION 
      
      
 Model  1 Model  2 
Variable Name Coefficient Std Error  Coefficient Std Error 
      
Demographic  Variables      
Black -0.183 0.149  -0.185 0.148 
Other Race 0.044 0.190  0.039 0.190 
College -0.264 0.112  -0.259 0.112 
Very Good Health -0.169 0.094  -0.168 0.095 
Spouse Disabled 0.259 0.146  0.255 0.146 
Spouse Retired 0.321 0.127  0.319 0.126 
Spouse Homemaker -0.219 0.122  -0.217 0.122 
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off -0.005 0.055  -0.006 0.054 
      
      
Workplace Variables 
     
Log Spouse Income -0.021 0.010  -0.021 0.010 
Log Own Income -0.131 0.013  -0.131 0.012 
Defined Benefit Plan 1.610 0.141  1.610 0.141 
Defined Contribution Plan 0.624 0.123  0.626 0.123 
Both Types of Plan 
Manager/Professional 
Office Worker 
0.875 
-0.486 
-0.301 
0.174 
0.120 
0.127 
 
0.879 
-0.487 
-0.300 
0.174 
0.120 
0.127 
      
      
Housing Variables      
Home Equity Spline Part 1 -0.204 1.555  -0.205 1.552 
Home Equity Spline Part 2 -0.651 0.342  -0.650 0.342 
Log Mortgage 
Ownership 
-0.036 
0.773 
0.008 
0.212 
 
-0.036 
0.770 
0.008 
0.212 
      
      
Other Wealth Variables      
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 1 5.693 1.232  5.649 1.230 
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 2 -0.125 0.066  -0.136 0.067 
      
      
Great Recession Variables      
Equity 2006 -0.669 0.328  -0.549 0.344 
Non-Housing Wealth x Great Recession    -0.098 0.096 
Defined Benefit Plan x Great Recession 1.493 0.257  1.476 0.257 
Defined Compensation x Great Recession 0.559 0.170  0.552 0.170 
Both Types of Plan x Great Recession 
Manager/Professional x Great Recession 
Office Worker x Great Recession 
Ownership x Great Recession 
1.240 
-0.068 
-0.446 
0.052 
0.260 
0.180 
0.213 
0.202 
 
1.235 
-0.052 
-0.427 
0.061 
0.260 
0.180 
0.213 
0.202 
Post 1999 -0.086 0.085  -0.088 0.085 
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION 
      
      
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable Name Coefficient Std Error  Coefficient Std Error 
      
Age Indicators      
Age 59 -3.067 0.241  -3.064 0.240 
Age 60 -2.661 0.241  -2.659 0.240 
Age 61 -2.505 0.248  -2.503 0.247 
Age 62 -0.946 0.256  -0.947 0.255 
Age 63 -1.007 0.290  -1.010 0.289 
Age 64 -1.110 0.321  -1.113 0.319 
Age 65 -0.387 0.349  -0.390 0.347 
Age 66 -0.118 0.393  -0.122 0.391 
Age 67 -0.412 0.446  -0.418 0.444 
Age 68 -0.414 0.484  -0.422 0.481 
Age 69 -0.479 0.522  -0.487 0.519 
Age 70 -0.233 0.547  -0.239 0.543 
Age 71-78 -0.290 0.574  -0.296 0.570 
      
Gamma Variance 1.207 0.291  1.193 0.289 
Log L -3930.463  -3929.898 
LR test between Model 1 and Model 2 = 1.130 
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TABLE 4 
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION 
      
      
 Model  3 Model  4 
Variable Name Coefficient Std Error  Coefficient Std Error 
      
Demographic  Variables      
Black -0.192 0.151  -0.195 0.149 
Other Race 0.027 0.194  0.024 0.191 
College -0.271 0.114  -0.261 0.113 
Very Good Health -0.170 0.096  -0.166 0.095 
Spouse Disabled 0.269 0.149  0.259 0.147 
Spouse Retired 0.324 0.129  0.320 0.127 
Spouse Homemaker -0.236 0.125  -0.229 0.123 
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off -0.006 0.055  -0.007 0.055 
      
      
Workplace Variables 
     
Log Spouse Income -0.022 0.011  -0.022 0.011 
Log Own Income -0.132 0.013  -0.130 0.013 
Defined Benefit Plan 1.610 0.143  1.608 0.142 
Defined Contribution Plan 0.615 0.125  0.620 0.124 
Both Types of Plan 
Manager/Professional 
Office Worker 
0.854 
-0.496 
-0.309 
0.178 
0.123 
0.129 
 
0.868 
-0.492 
-0.304 
0.175 
0.121 
0.128 
      
      
Housing Variables      
Home Equity Spline Part 1 -0.232 1.571  -0.234 1.558 
Home Equity Spline Part 2 -0.540 0.336  -0.571 0.336 
Log Mortgage 
Ownership 
-0.037 
0.780 
0.008 
0.215 
 
-0.037 
0.773 
0.008 
0.213 
      
      
Other Wealth Variables      
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 1 5.776 1.249  5.664 1.239 
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 2 -0.121 0.066  -0.135 0.067 
      
      
Great Recession Variables      
Foreclosure Rate 
Foreclosure Rate x Year 2009 
-25.223 
-4.747 
10.536 
10.187 
 
-24.226 
-4.201 
10.501 
10.153 
Non-Housing Wealth x Great Recession    -0.140 0.094 
Defined Benefit Plan x Great Recession 1.518 0.262  1.482 0.261 
Defined Compensation x Great Recession 0.560 0.173  0.552 0.171 
Both Types of Plan x Great Recession 
Manager/Professional x Great Recession 
Office Worker x Great Recession 
Ownership x Great Recession 
1.251 
-0.103 
-0.475 
0.150 
0.264 
0.182 
0.216 
0.215 
 
1.245 
-0.063 
-0.437 
0.176 
0.263 
0.181 
0.214 
0.214 
Post 1999 -0.084 0.086  -0.087 0.085 
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TABLE 4 (cont’d) 
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION 
      
      
 Model 3  Model 4 
Variable Name Coefficient Std Error  Coefficient Std Error 
      
Age Indicators      
Age 59 -3.055 0.244  -3.058 0.241 
Age 60 -2.645 0.244  -2.651 0.242 
Age 61 -2.483 0.252  -2.493 0.249 
Age 62 -0.915 0.262  -0.933 0.258 
Age 63 -0.963 0.299  -0.991 0.293 
Age 64 -1.058 0.332  -1.090 0.325 
Age 65 -0.323 0.362  -0.360 0.355 
Age 66 -0.045 0.410  -0.090 0.401 
Age 67 -0.336 0.464  -0.389 0.454 
Age 68 -0.334 0.505  -0.393 0.494 
Age 69 -0.389 0.545  -0.451 0.533 
Age 70 -0.139 0.572  -0.202 0.559 
Age 71-78 -0.210 0.602  -0.273 0.585 
      
Gamma Variance 1.281 0.310  1.223 0.301 
Log L -3929.337  -3928.069 
LR test between Model 3 and Model 4 = 
 
2.536 
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Table 5 
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION 
 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variable Name Coefficient 
Std 
Error Coefficient 
Std 
Error Coefficient 
Std 
Error 
Demographic  Variables     
Black -0.195 0.149 -0.196 0.148 -0.179 0.151 
Other Race 0.037 0.191 0.032 0.190 0.033 0.194 
College -0.257 0.112 -0.252 0.112 -0.281 0.114 
Very Good Health -0.166 0.095 -0.164 0.095 -0.174 0.096 
Spouse Disabled 0.253 0.147 0.249 0.146 0.279 0.149 
Spouse Retired 0.322 0.127 0.320 0.126 0.324 0.129 
Spouse Homemaker -0.222 0.123 -0.221 0.122 -0.233 0.125 
Spouse Homemaker x Years Off -0.006 0.055 -0.007 0.054 -0.006 0.055 
       
Workplace Variables     
Log Spouse Income -0.021 0.010 -0.021 0.010 -0.022 0.011 
Log Own Income -0.130 0.012 -0.130 0.012 -0.133 0.013 
Defined Benefit Plan 1.606 0.141 1.606 0.141 1.616 0.143 
Defined Contribution Plan 0.621 0.123 0.623 0.123 0.617 0.126 
Both Types of Plan 0.869 0.175 0.874 0.174 0.857 0.178 
Manager or Professional -0.488 0.120 -0.489 0.120 -0.495 0.123 
Office Worker -0.301 0.127 -0.299 0.127 -0.311 0.130 
       
Housing Variables      
Home Equity Spline Part 1 -0.256 1.554 -0.256 1.550 -0.171 1.576 
Home Equity Spline Part 2 -0.652 0.342 -0.651 0.342 -0.524 0.336 
Log Mortgage -0.037 0.008 -0.037 0.008 -0.036 0.008 
Ownership 0.778 0.212 0.776 0.212 0.774 0.215 
       
Other Wealth Variables     
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 1 5.663 1.233 5.619 1.230 5.827 1.251 
Non-Housing Wealth Spline Part 2 -0.125 0.066 -0.133 0.067 -0.119 0.066 
       
Great Recession Variables     
Equity 2006 -0.604 0.327 -0.491 0.343   
Foreclosure Rate -23.184 10.436 -22.886 10.441   
Foreclosure Rate * Year 2009 -3.534 9.970 -3.397 9.994   
Non-Housing Wealth x Great Recession -0.093 0.096   
Defined Benefit Plan x Great Recession 1.484 0.258 1.468 0.258 1.533 0.263 
Defined Contribution x Great Recession 0.570 0.171 0.563 0.170 0.546 0.173 
29 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 (cont’d) 
PRENTICE-GLOECKLER-MEYER ESTIMATION 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variable Name Coefficient 
Std 
Error Coefficient 
Std 
Error Coefficient 
Std 
Error 
Both Types of Plan x Great Recession 1.251 0.261 1.245 0.261 1.237 0.263 
Manager or Professional x Great Recession -0.051 0.181 -0.036 0.180 -0.127 0.182 
Office Worker x Great Recession -0.435 0.213 -0.417 0.213 -0.494 0.216 
Ownership x Great Recession 0.209 0.215 0.216 0.214 -0.031 0.201 
Post 1999 -0.085 0.085 -0.087 0.085 -0.086 0.086 
       
Age Indicators      
Age 59 -3.073 0.241 -3.070 0.240 -3.045 0.244 
Age 60 -2.667 0.241 -2.665 0.240 -2.635 0.245 
Age 61 -2.510 0.248 -2.509 0.247 -2.472 0.253 
Age 62 -0.953 0.256 -0.955 0.255 -0.899 0.264 
Age 63 -1.015 0.290 -1.019 0.287 -0.944 0.300 
Age 64 -1.115 0.322 -1.120 0.320 -1.041 0.333 
Age 65 -0.391 0.350 -0.397 0.348 -0.304 0.363 
Age 66 -0.127 0.394 -0.132 0.392 -0.021 0.411 
Age 67 -0.428 0.447 -0.436 0.444 -0.301 0.467 
Age 68 -0.432 0.485 -0.442 0.482 -0.295 0.507 
Age 69 -0.492 0.524 -0.503 0.520 -0.354 0.547 
Age 70 -0.244 0.548 -0.254 0.545 -0.104 0.574 
Age 71-78 -0.313 0.574 -0.323 0.570 -0.162 0.605 
       
Gamma Variance 1.202 0.292 1.186 0.289 1.302 0.312 
Log Likelihood -3927.482 -3926.986 -3932.726 
LR test between model 5 and model 6 = 0.992 
LR test between model 5 and model 7 = 12.768 
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strengthened. Unless they sell their home, the peak value is the only true value that homeowners 
know. 
Models that we estimate are consistent with the idea that households use peak housing 
values as a reference point after the Great Recession starts. Households are uncertain about the 
true current value of their home. Households are certain only about the peak value of their home 
and the fact that the true current value is substantially lower than the peak. The greater is the 
peak value, the greater is the amount of wealth possibly lost. So, if households respond to lost 
wealth by delaying retirement, a possible conclusion to be drawn is that Great-Recession 
retirement rates are lower, the higher is the peak value of housing. 
The Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer estimation results for the first self-reported retirement of 
male spouses using the pre-Recession peak housing value to calculate 2006 home equity are 
presented in Table 3. The effect of financial wealth after 2006 is excluded in Model 1 and 
included in Model 2.3 Corresponding estimation results using the local foreclosure rate4 and not 
2006 home equity are presented in Table 4. Models 5 and 6 in Table 5 include both 2006 home 
equity and the local foreclosure rate. Model 7 is the baseline model for model selection; it 
excludes 2006 home equity, the local foreclosure rate and financial wealth variables in the post-
2006 period. 
Table 6 gives BIC and AIC for the seven models. Because of the large number of 
parameters in our study, model selection penalties for additional parameters using BIC are 
                                                          
3 Similarly, in Tables 3 through 5 even-numbered models include post-2006 financial wealth while odd-numbered models do not. 
4 The local foreclosure rate represents the percentage of homes in the zip code for which foreclosure proceeding start in the first 
week of July of the given calendar year. The variable is zeroed out for renters. In 2007, the start of the Great Recession, the 
variable is zeroed out for residents of states other than California, Arizona, Florida and those in the Northeast and Midwest. For 
2009 only, the variable has a new value for residents of all states. 
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substantially larger than those using AIC. In our case this means that BIC will always choose the 
model with fewer additional parameters, while AIC may choose the larger model. Therefore, we 
will use AIC as our model selection criterion. AIC indicates that Model 5, the model including 
2006 home equity and the local foreclosure rate but excluding financial wealth in the post-2006 
period, is best. Figure 2 presents the predicted retirement rates from Model 5. It captures the 
empirical retirement rates in Figure 1 very well.  
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 2 here] 
 The first important result in Model 5 is that the coefficients of the 2006 home equity and the 
local foreclosure rate for the post-2006 period are jointly significant negative. The second 
important result is that unobserved heterogeneity matters. The Gamma-distributed random effect 
is significantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level.  
Looking next at the demographic variables, race does not matter for retirement behavior, 
but having a college degree and being in good health both significantly delay retirement. Male 
spouses are more likely to retire if their wives have already retired. This is consistent with the 
life cycle theories and other studies claiming couples will jointly retire and enjoy more leisure 
together. Male spouses are less likely to retire if their wives are homemakers.  
The workplace variables are better predictors of retirement behavior than the 
demographic variables. A married male will delay his retirement the higher is his own income, 
and the higher is his wife’s income.  
The effect of having a defined benefit plan apparently swamps the effect of having a 
defined contribution plan, although having either type of plan significantly increases the 
retirement hazard rate. These results do not change qualitatively in the period after 2006.  
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Table 6: Model Selection Criteria 
 
 
 BIC AIC 
Model 1 8170.768 7946.926 
Model 2 8176.844 7947.796 
Model 3 8175.722 7946.674 
Model 4 8180.392 7946.138 
Model 5 8179.226 7944.972 
Model 6 8185.431 7945.972 
Model 7 8168.089 7949.452 
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Figure 2: 
  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Entire Sample 0.150 0.144 0.162 0.132 0.152 0.141 0.166 0.145 0.160 0.144 0.128 0.100 0.116 0.093 0.114 0.096
Early Retirement 0.245 0.229 0.258 0.209 0.233 0.207 0.219 0.187 0.209 0.195 0.190 0.166 0.197 0.154 0.181 0.152
Normal Retirement 0.301 0.273 0.284 0.219 0.251 0.195 0.214 0.185 0.209 0.191 0.178 0.138 0.168 0.135 0.170 0.138
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
R
et
ir
em
en
t 
R
at
e
Year
Predicted Retirement Rate, 1997-2012
Entire Sample Early Retirement Normal Retirement
34 
 
 
 
For the pre-Great Recession years, married males who own a home tend to retire earlier, 
but this effect is mitigated the greater is any mortgage. Home equity enters the specifications as a 
two-part spline with the knot at the median pre-2007 level of home equity ($94K in 2005 
dollars). Both parts of the spline have coefficients that are insignificantly negative at the 5 
percent level based on a two-tailed test. A possible reason for these signs is that married males 
with greater home equity do not retire as early because they have jobs that they find pleasant. But 
note that the point estimate of the coefficient for the home-ownership indicator dominates the 
effect of home equity so that the combined effect is positive. 
The situation changes with the Housing Bust. We have argued that, after the Housing 
Bust, homeowners become more uncertain about current and future values of homes and that 
retirement is delayed when the uncertainty and possible equity loss, which is correlated with pre-
Housing Bust home values, increases. The coefficient on home equity is negative with a one-
tailed p-value of 0.0301. The coefficient has the same magnitude as the second part of the home-
equity spline before the Housing Bust. So, we cannot conclusively say that married males who 
own their homes delay retirement because of concerns over possible equity loss, because we 
cannot rule out job satisfaction as the reason for the delay. However, the coefficient of the home-
ownership indicator has become insignificant, suggesting that housing wealth matters less after 
the Housing Bust.  
[Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 here] 
The coefficient on the local foreclosure rate has a p-value less than 0.01, suggesting that a 
higher foreclosure rate decreases the retirement rate of homeowners. (The LR Chi-square of joint 
significance for home equity and the local foreclosure rate also has a p-value less than 0.01.) 
Figures 3-5 present the average predicted retirement rates based on model 5 for three cohorts at 
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the 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile values for the local foreclosure rate over the 
period from 2007 to 2012. The largest difference between the 10th percentile and the 90th 
percentile is always at early retirement age and at normal retirement age. The retirement rate of 
10th percentile would decrease by about 25 percent if a male were living in an area with the 90th 
percentile foreclosure rate.  
The level of financial assets in years before 2007 enters the specifications as a two-part 
spline with the knot at the median pre-2007 level of financial assets ($107K in 2005 dollars). The 
first part of the spline (to the left of the knot)) is significantly positive with a p-value less than 
0.01. This is consistent with the hypothesis that households with more wealth retire earlier. The 
second part of the spline, with higher values of financial wealth, is negative but insignificant. 
The retirement hazard rate increases sharply at early retirement age and again at normal 
retirement age. It declines gradually thereafter. 
Summary 
This study uses Health and Retirement Study data from waves 1992 through 2012 
together with restricted SSA data on geographic location to estimate a model of the age at first 
self-reported retirement for the subsample of married males. The model covariates include 
demographic variables, workplace variables, non-housing financial wealth, and housing equity. 
We estimate proportional hazard models with controls for unobserved heterogeneity and find that 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity improves the fit. The proportional hazard estimates are, 
for the most part, significant and of the correct sign. The model estimates are consistent with the 
hypothesis that uncertainty about the extent of current and future declines in housing wealth after 
the Housing Bust significantly delayed the retirement of married males. In particular, the effect 
of local foreclosures on the retirement rate significantly decreased retirement rates in four parts 
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of the country (Northeast, Midwest, Florida, and Arizona/California) in 2007. The effect was 
national by 2008.  
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Figure 3: 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Foreclosure Rate 10 0.0248 0.0430 0.0511 0.1961 0.1525 0.0917
Foreclosure Rate 50 0.0214 0.0373 0.0496 0.1689 0.1416 0.0831
Foreclosure Rate 90 0.0179 0.0328 0.0482 0.1439 0.1282 0.0720
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Figure 4: 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Foreclosure Rate 10 0.1500 0.1451 0.1336 0.2212 0.2456 0.1481
Foreclosure Rate 50 0.1317 0.1293 0.1331 0.1952 0.2343 0.1381
Foreclosure Rate 90 0.1116 0.1164 0.1322 0.1704 0.2183 0.1237
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Figure 5: 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Foreclosure Rate 10 0.0248 0.0430 0.0511 0.1961 0.1525 0.0917
Foreclosure Rate 50 0.0214 0.0373 0.0496 0.1689 0.1416 0.0831
Foreclosure Rate 90 0.0179 0.0328 0.0482 0.1439 0.1282 0.0720
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Chapter 2 
Outline 
The aging population has become substantially larger as baby boomers have started 
entering the end of their working lifetime, when the security provided by wealth becomes more 
important. Approximately 80 percent of households near retirement age are homeowners and 
housing wealth is the principal form of savings for the majority of households. This figure 
declines only slightly until age 80, after which there is greater mortality and nursing home 
utilization. 
It is still a puzzle why the elderly rarely tap into housing wealth. Hurd and Smith (2001) 
find that death and medical expenses do not substantially reduce the size of estates in the Asset 
and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD). Venti and Wise (2004) find that elderly 
movers are not typically taking substantial home equity out of their housing wealth to support 
other consumption. Furthermore, couples are even likely to move into more expensive homes 
after entering retirement or widowhood. Few elderly American households have sufficient 
financial wealth for increasing medical costs. In fact, the total wealth (including housing wealth) 
of many older workers may be inadequate unless they are willing to move into smaller homes 
(Skinner 2007). Recently, a growing empirical literature argues that consumption responds to 
house price movements, thus suggesting housing wealth should not be ignored in the dynamic 
consumption model (Campbell and Cocco 2007; Mian, Rao, and Sufi et al. 2013.). On the other 
hand, an increasing number of studies construct life cycle models with durable consumption and 
examine the effects of housing wealth on non-durable consumption, asset accumulation, 
financial investment and labor incentives. 
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Ondrich and Falevich (2015) estimate hazard models to show that significant declines in 
housing wealth delay retirement. If consumers only expect a slow recovery from large housing 
price declines, borrowing constraints related to housing wealth may hurt their ability for smooth 
consumption after retirement and force them to work more. Furthermore, housing wealth plays 
an important role in the precautionary saving and bequest motive. It may be used to pay 
unexpected medical costs and large funeral fees. In addition, a desired bequest level may force 
elderly households to work more and leave more non-housing wealth to offset the loss of 
housing wealth. Although housing investment decisions are not considered, the purpose of this 
paper is to study the role of housing wealth on retirement plans in a structural framework. 
There are four possible explanations why the elderlies are reluctant to tap housing wealth. 
The first one is psychological. The elderly may find it difficult to leave a place where they have 
lived for a long time and have a well-established social network. The second explanation is that 
home ownership may provide utility. The third explanation is precautionary savings. An 
uncertain lifespan and medical costs are two large contingencies for the elderly. Venti and Wise 
(2004) argue that housing wealth is ideal for future contingencies because home equity can easily 
be used to finance unexpected shocks. However, they note that utilization of reverse mortgages 
and selling homes are available options not commonly used by retirees. The fourth explanation is 
the bequest motive. When the elderlies treat their children as their own extended lives, planning 
a bequest of housing wealth is reasonable. Incorporating bequests into an economic model is 
problematic. Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002) explain that it is virtually impossible to 
distinguish a bequest from precautionary saving. 
To study retirement behavior, it is important to take account of non-housing resources 
available to households as well. Social Security is one of the important source of income 
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affecting the living standards of the elderly. Unfortunately, Social Security expenditures already 
represent a large portion of government spending. In 2002 Social Security expenditures 
accounted for 22.6 percent of Federal spending5. Moreover, these expenditures are expected to 
increase substantially as baby boomers begin to the retire and the program's future solvency is a 
major policy concern. 
The goal of Social Security is to provide insurance against a long lifespan. However, 
Social Security distorts incentives to work and may cause people to retire early (see.French 2005, 
and Blundell, French, and Tetlow 2017). According to previous studies, for example, Blau 
(1994), French (2005), French and Jones (2011), and Gustman and Steinmeier (2015), there is a 
spike in the retirement rate at early retirement age. Some unusual application strategies can 
maximize Social Security wealth, but we find little evidence that the elderly know about those 
strategies. Hence, we do not attempt to model non-standard application strategies. Finally, 
because sample members in the sample used in this study were born between 1940 and 1945, 
Social Security rules enacted in 2000 that eliminate the earnings test after the normal retirement 
age apply. 
Pensions and spousal income outside of Social Security are also included as liquid assets 
in our model, even though we do not distinguish between single, widowed and coupled males. 
Although males with any marital status may be sample members, wealth measurements in the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) are at the household level. Pensions are included in our 
model as annuities, and spousal income is included as a determinate function of male health and 
age. 
                                                          
5 URL: https://www.ssa.gov/history/percent.html 
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Medical costs, health insurance and Medicare are the focus of several studies in the last 
decade (see, for example, Rust and Phelan 1997, French 2005, De Nardi, French, and Jones 
2010, and French and Jones 2011). It is important to include these factors in a discussion of 
retirement behavior. Poor health not only limits the functional ability but also induces higher 
medical expenses for the elderly. Time persistence of medical costs accelerates the decline of 
liquid wealth. Moreover, if the elderlies suffer from severe health problems and must move to a 
nursing home, the extraordinarily high medical costs may force them to tap housing wealth. 
Medicare may be the main reason for a second-high retirement rate peak at age 65, because 
deduction of medical costs from Medicare decreases out-of-pocket medical costs. Our model 
considers the dynamics of medical costs through three insurance types: no insurance, retiree 
covered insurance and job-tied insurance. This insurance categorization follows the model of 
French and Jones (2011). 
In summary, this paper studies retirement and saving behavior and the bequest motive 
through housing wealth in a world of risks, with five main sources of uncertainty: health status, 
wage, medical cost, and mortality risk as determined partially by health status, as well as housing 
prices. We construct a life-cycle model with wealth and bequest components and distinguish 
between liquid assets and housing wealth. We experiment with the two asset accumulations and 
constraints and examine the savings behavior in the presence of housing wealth. The most 
relevant financial variables are carefully addressed. Additionally, we take into account the strong 
bequest motive among wealthy households and the manner in which social welfare programs 
affect poor households. The Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) is used to estimate 
parameters in the life cycle model. Robustness checks are based on the models without housing 
wealth and heterogeneity. 
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The literature review is presented in the following section. It includes important studies in 
Social Security, retirement, housing, saving behavior, and methodologies. The third section 
develops the construction of a life cycle dynamic model. Two alternative asset accumulation 
equations to cope with housing wealth are compared and discussed. The first takes into account 
the "imaginary" part of housing wealth in the liquid asset accumulation. The other one follows 
two traditional types of consumption model with a collateral constraint. The purpose is to 
account for households with high housing wealth but low non-housing wealth. The fourth section 
describes the data preparation and profile estimation. This is followed by a discussion of the 
moment conditions and methodology used in the paper. The methodology contains the numerical 
solution to the dynamic programming problem and Minimum Distance Estimation to identify the 
parameters. The sixth section presents the estimation results, model fitness and robustness check, 
followed by a comparison of three counterfactual experiments. The final section presents 
conclusion and discussion. 
Literature Review 
In the last two decades, many papers show that Social Security is one of the main reasons 
for the high retirement rate at age 62 and availability of Medicare causes another peak at normal 
retirement age6. Rust and Phelan (1997) implement Rust's dynamic discrete choice framework to 
analyze how Social Security and Medicare affect the labor supply of poorer households. Saving 
behavior is not modeled, but the model fits actual labor supply behavior and accounts for the 
spikes in retirement at 62 and 65. However, liquidity constraints and saving behavior may be 
needed to study the effects of the Social Security rules on lifetime labor supply more generally 
                                                          
6 Social Security Disability Insurance is an important part of the Social Security program. This paper mainly focuses on the 
retirement benefits. 
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(French 2005). Blau (2008) shows that median assets in the HRS grow until people are in their 
later 60s. Furthermore, French and Jones (2011) take account of health insurance and medical 
costs in their structural model and find that people without health insurance are more likely to 
retire at the normal retirement age, while people with health insurance are more likely to 
continue to work. None of these studies separate housing wealth from total wealth. 
Some reduced-form studies conclude that Social Security is one of the main reasons older 
workers retire at age 62. Blau (1994) analyzes labor force movements of older men using 
quarterly data from the Retirement History Survey, and his estimates indicate that Social 
Security benefits have strong effects on labor force transitions of older men. Medicare 
availability may cause the retirement spike at age 65. Using an option-value model, Coile and 
Gruber (2007) implement forward-looking models and invent a new measure which they call 
peak value to show that higher future Social Security benefits delay retirement. However, 
reduced-form studies often model retirement and Social Security claim as simultaneous 
decisions. An exception is Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos (2004), who use a bivariate probit 
model to study Social Security claim and retirement behavior at age 62. They find that people 
with a high subjective survival probability retire earlier and claim Social Security earlier. The 
advantage of the dynamic programming model which we use is that it allows households to be 
forward-looking and make various decisions interactively. 
It is not clear how well structural models can predict actual Social Security claiming 
behavior in the face of rules and economic environment changes. Many policy changes increase 
the gains from delays in claiming, particularly for cohorts that are eligible to collect Social 
Security after 2000. It has been shown theoretically that postponing the claiming of Social 
Security is advantageous for most individuals, especially couples, given increases in life 
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expectancy and recent declines in interest rates (Shoven and Slavov, 2012, 2013). However, 
empirical evidence does not agree. Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) use the MSM technique to 
estimate an enhanced version of a structural model that jointly explains benefit claiming, wealth 
and retirement with uncertain interest rates and wages. They find that the observed timing of 
claims in the HRS is earlier than the optimal timing. They estimate that observed timing and 
optimal timing would coincide if benefits were cut 20 percent, suggesting that individuals expect 
benefit cuts in the future. 
In the traditional life-cycle model, a significant decline in housing prices should have a 
strong impact on life-cycle wealth and hence on retirement consumption and other related 
behavior. Skinner (1996) takes advantage of housing windfalls during the 1970s to study 
consumption responses and argues that housing wealth is not a sideshow. But if households do 
not tap housing wealth, how is housing wealth embodied into the budget constraint? Rising 
house prices may stimulate consumption by increasing household's perceived present and 
expected future wealth or by relaxing borrowing constraints. Campbell and Cocco (2007) find 
that regional house prices affect growth in regional consumption, but do not provide a structural 
justification. There are some studies on housing wealth and life-cycle portfolio choices (Cocco 
2004, Yogo 2016). Kaplan and Violante (2014) develop an optimal life cycle model with two 
assets and replicate the phenomenon that many households hold little or no liquid wealth despite 
owning sizable quantities of illiquid assets. They solve the long-term Euler equation for housing 
investment and compare it to the short-term one. They find strong wealth effects on 
consumption. 
Precaution against future contingencies is the primary reason for saving. The Survey of 
Consumer Finance Finds the primary reason to be retirement (for 45 percent of households), 
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emergency or illness (40 percent), and estate (15 percent) (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2002). 
Bequests are likely to be luxury goods. Although households may care about leaving money to 
their descendants, adding a bequest motive on top of an existing motive for precautionary saving 
would have relatively little impact on capital accumulation for nearly all households, except 
maybe those at the highest wealth level. De Nardi (2004) develops a quantitative overlapping-
generations model in which parents and children are linked by voluntary bequests and replicates 
empirical wealth inequality in old age: bequests are luxury goods. 
Recently, more attention has been paid to durable consumption in the life-cycle model. 
Cocco (2004) studies the effect of housing wealth on the portfolio choice of stock and bond 
investment in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Campbell and Cocco (2014) extend 
Coco's model to incorporate fixed and adjustable rate mortgages and construct a structural 
mortgage-default model. In the labor field, Aaronson, Agarwal and French (2013) include 
housing wealth in asset accumulation and study the spending and debt response to changes in the 
minimum wage. Including housing wealth allows the agents to have debt on an asset and 
guarantees no bankruptcy through a collateral constraint. Nakajima and Telyukova (2017) give a 
thorough study of the utilization of reverse mortgage loans in the HRS. Many of the models are 
partial equilibrium in the sense that housing price is exogenous. The study by Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2016) is an exception. Their study successfully generates the boom-
bust episodes when skeptical agents happen to be correct. 
Because of computational improvements, more complex structural models can now be 
estimated. Discrete choice dynamic programming is widely used in labor economics, industrial 
organization, and other fields. General surveys are found in Rust (1994), Aguirregabiria and 
Mira (2010), and Todd, Wolpin, and Keane (2010). Rust (1987) proposes a framework for 
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estimating parameters in structural models and uses it empirically solve the optimal bus-engine 
replacement problem. Rust (1994) describes the process of dynamic structural model estimation 
and both partial and full information estimators in detail. By imposing an extreme value 
distribution, the likelihood function becomes closed form and easily estimated by maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE). However, when decisions are continuous and unobservable, like 
consumption, the MLE method becomes difficult. As an alternative, McFadden (1989) develops 
the MSM to deal with high-dimensional decisions. The criterion is minimization of weighted 
mean-square error. Epple and Sieg (1999) extend this technique to estimate quantile moments. 
Rust (1997) proves that the Monte Carlo randomization method in dynamic models is useful to 
break the curse of dimensionality and asymptotically approaches a normal distribution. Empirical 
applications are Gourinchas and Parker (2002) for consumer behavior, French (2005) for 
retirement, and Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) for education investment. 
Forward-Looking Structural Model 
The starting point is the structural model developed by French and Jones (2011). A 
representative agent faces five time-varying uncertainties: mortality, wages, housing price, health 
status, and latent health-dependent re-entry type. Utility at time t takes the Cobb-Douglas form: 
 1 1
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where tC  is consumption at age t , and tL  is leisure at age t . The within-period leisure 
constraint is given by: 
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where L  is the total time endowment, tHours  is the chosen number of working hours, 0  is the 
time cost of poor health, w  is the time cost of labor force participation and tPar  is one if the 
individual chooses to be in the labor force at age t , r  is the time cost of labor force re-entry. tR  
is the dependent re-entry latent class type (re-entry is possible only for individuals with tR  equal 
to one); tR  is a logit probability, the index function for which falls with poor health and as 
individuals age. 
The time cost of labor force participation is given by: 
 1 2 ( 60)w t       (8) 
where 1  is the fixed time cost of working, and 2  is the age-dependent variable time cost of 
working. These two time costs take into account the empirical clustering of working hours at 0 
and 2000 hours per year, and allow leisure to be more valuable when people get older. r  is zero 
when there is lagged labor-force participation or the current re-entry is not possible. If retirees 
want to work again, they experience loss of leisure to find a new job. More details on rR  are 
presented in the profile estimation section. The model is a partial equilibrium of labor supply 
market in which wage is exogenous. To determine wages within the model, we calibrate the 
wage elasticity from French and Jones (2011). 
Asset accumulation within the model is determined by five resources: wages, Social 
Security benefits, private pensions, spousal income and an unknown proportion of housing 
wealth. Given that we do not allow bankruptcy, assets should be non-negative. But putting 
housing wealth into the assets accumulation equation directly will allow those who are housing 
rich but financially poor to sometimes be in violation of the nonnegative asset constraint. To 
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prevent this from happening, we impose a collateral constraint. Housing wealth is taken to be 
exogenous. Kaplan and Violante (2015) provide an excellent life-cycle model with housing 
choice. For downsizing homes, readers can refer to Yogo (2016). The asset accumulation 
equation is given by: 
 1 1* *t t t t t t tA H A H Y C M          (9) 
 0,tA t    (10) 
where tA  is non-housing assets, tH  is housing wealth, tY  is after-tax household income 
including Social Security and pension benefits and return on assets, tC  is a consumption, and 
tM  is medical costs.   is an unknown parameter that captures the percentage of housing wealth 
that households view as liquid. Thus, consumer and saving behaviors are affected by housing 
wealth. When solving the optimization, we move the term of * tH  to the left side and use 
1 1*( )t t tA H H    as total assets. 
We use the 2004 head of households tax formula from taxfoundation.org to obtain 
available after-tax income. After-tax income is given by: 
 ( * * * , )t t t t t t t tY Y W Hours B SS ps sp r A        (11) 
where tW  is the hourly wage rate, tSS  is Social Security benefits, tB  is the Social Security 
application decision, tps  is pension benefits, tsp  is spousal income, and * tr A  is the return on 
assets. The interest rate is set equal to 2.5 percent. 
A modified model comprises the original model with a modified asset accumulation 
process. The modified version is given by: 
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 1t t t t tA A Y C M       (12) 
 * ,t eqline tA H t     (13) 
where tA  is allowed to be negative, but debt cannot be larger than the equity line on housing 
wealth. The equity line percentage is set to 0.75 across the entire life cycle. Moreover, there is no 
fixed cost from borrowing housing wealth. The results of the modified model improve the asset 
accumulation performance over the original model results. 
Government provided aid guarantees a minimum consumption level for households. 
Because of these social welfare programs, households with low assets may be reluctant to save. 
The government transfers equation is based on Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994): 
  max 0, ( )t floor t t ttr C A Y M      (14) 
where ttr  is government transfers at time t , and floorC  is the guaranteed consumption floor. 
There are many social welfare programs for poor households, such as SSI, food stamps, and 
Medicaid. Transfers take place after agents run out of current cash-on-hand and are triggered at 
the next period. Therefore, poor families tend to maintain low assets to obtain government 
transfers. If growing housing wealth increases consumption and decreases savings, it may 
impose more financial burden on the social welfare program. 
If the agent dies in the next period, total wealth is the input of the bequest function. With 
no bequest motive, total wealth is optimally exhausted at the final period. However, empirical 
evidence shows a great amount of wealth left upon the elderly's death. Lee Lockwood (2012) 
summarizes properties of different bequest functions in theoretical and empirical studies. The 
empirical bequest equation is given by: 
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where b  is marginal propensity of consumption from bequest, and k  is the curvature of the 
bequest function. Importantly, the original and modified models include housing wealth in the 
bequest motive. One robustness check eliminates housing wealth from the bequest component. 
Intuitively, if b  is high, the consumption path will also be higher and wealth path lower. k  is 
the curvature of the bequest equation. Families with total wealth above k  will leave a bequest. 
Given the above setup, the Bellman equation is: 
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where tS  is the set of state variables at time t , ts  is the conditional survival probability at time 
t , and td  represents the set of decision variables.   is the set of unknown parameters, 
 0 1 2, , , , , , , , , , ,r b k floorL C           . 
The econometric methodology is based on John Rust's framework combined with MSM. 
Belief equations constituting an individual's profile are estimated before estimating preference 
parameters. Belief equations are independent during estimation7. Preference estimation is 
performed in two loops. In the inner loop, we use backward induction to solve maximization of 
the Bellman equation. Discretization is used to address continuous state variables. We use 
Tauchen's (1986) method to generate the Markov transition matrix for wage innovations and 
                                                          
7 This is the conditional independent assumption in John Rust (1994). Full information estimation needs to adjust data generating 
process during preference parameters estimation. To save time, we use partial information estimation. 
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medical cost innovations. Because the housing price innovation is i.i.d, five-point Gaussian 
quadrature is used to solve the expectation of the home price. After solving the dynamic 
programming problem, three-dimension linear interpolation is used to obtain solutions for 
consumption, working hours, participation, and Social Security application. In the outer loop, we 
use the simplex method and MSM to estimate parameters by minimizing the distance between 
simulated and observed moments. 
Data and Life-Cycle Profile 
HRS Data 
We use the HRS to estimate. The main dataset is Rand HRS version p, which includes 
data from 1992 to 2014. HRS surveys respondents are interviewed every two years and new 
cohorts are added into the survey every six years. The respondents in our sample are born 
between 1941 and 1945. The reasons for choosing these particular cohorts are twofold. First, the 
youngest respondents are age 69 in the year 2014, which are the last moment age and last 
calendar year, respectively, in the survey. Second, the normal retirement age can be fixed at age 
66. The average birth year is close to 1943. For the 1940 cohort, the normal retirement age is 65 
and six months. Normal retirement age gradually increases to age 66 for birth years after 1937 
and before 1954. On the other hand, we drop respondents who do not pay Social Security tax for 
five years and work for the government. The effect of private pension plans is higher than Social 
Security for these respondents. Moreover, some are not eligible for Social Security benefits. To 
make the sample larger, we do not drop the respondents who collect Social Security Disability 
benefits. 
Labor force status is our object of study. We utilize the information in the current 
employment and working history, for example, whether the individual works for pay, and 
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information on primary and second jobs. Working hours are the sum of hours on primary jobs 
and second jobs. We use date information to generate non-survey year working status and use 
working hours to correct self-report errors. We do not distinguish between full-time jobs and 
part-time jobs. However, if information on working hours and working weeks is missing, we use 
1000 annual working hours for the part-time job and 2000 for the full-time job. Unemployment 
is treated as non-work8. For a non-survey year, if respondents are working or not working in two 
successive waves, respondents will be in the same labor status in the non-survey year and 
working hours are equal to the previous wave's working hours. If respondents stop working, the 
date information from the job history is used to fill the labor status in the non-survey year. 
Similarly, the date of a job start is used when the status transitions from non-worker to worker. 
For other variables in the non-survey year, some imputation rules are followed. Assets 
contain most of the components in the Rand HRS except home equity. For the non-survey year, 
assets are assumed to be equal to the previous year. Overall, changes in asset levels are smooth. 
Housing wealth changes are obtained from the FHFA Repeat Sales Index. The respondents who 
do not take the interview at wave 4 are dropped. All dollars measurements are deflated to the 
year 2000 level by the Consumer Price Index. 
We use pension wealth from Gustman and Steinmeier's contributions: Updated Pension 
Wealth Data Files in the HRS Panel: 1992 to 2010, Part III. Self-reported pension wealth is the 
sum of defined benefits from current job, last job, previous job, and defined contribution. The 
wave 4 provides the initial pension wealth. We use the method of pension profile estimation 
from French and Jones (2011) to control the private pension effects. 
                                                          
8 A different profile is generated with the self-report retirement. 
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Some information on initial conditions at wave 4 is missing. Not all respondents report 
their earnings history and pension wealth. We use Little's (1988) method to approximate 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME, used to calculate Social Security benefits) and 
pension wealth at wave 4. Table 7 presents a data description of initial conditions. Average self-
reported private pension wealth is between average housing and non-housing wealth. The mean 
difference across insurance types is extremely large. Health status is much worse for respondents 
who do not have insurance. Hourly wages, housing wealth, non-housing wealth and AIME is 
highest among the job-tied insurance group. Nearly half of job-tied insurance respondents prefer 
to work after age 62 and 65, while this number is about 38 percent for other insurance 
respondents. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Wages 
Wage depends on age, health status and innovations. Its transition function is given by: 
 1 1exp( ( , ) )t t tW w Age Health      (17) 
where 1tW   is the hourly wage rate at next period, w  is the log of hourly wage at current period, 
1t   is a transitory shock following a first-order auto-regressive normal distribution. 
Endogenous wage selection exists between full-time and part-time jobs. Fringe benefits 
may make the hourly wage for full-time workers lower than for part-time workers because part-
time workers usually do not have benefits such as health insurance. However, full-time jobs may 
require more skills than part-time jobs. Firms may be reluctant to improve the skills of part-time 
workers and hire part-time workers to do simpler jobs. We use the French and Jones (2011) 
wage-generating function: 
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Table 7: 
Initial Conditions 
 
 All None Retiree Tied 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Age 54.96 55.04 54.96 54.91 
Birth Year 1943 1942 1943 1943 
Health 0.2270 0.4537 0.1830 0.1441 
Participation 0.8213 0.8287 0.8093 0.8190 
Non-housing wealth 163600 95250 170600 198300 
Housing wealth 105100 63610 111500 122600 
Medcost 1491 1650 1416 1501 
Pension wealth 134200 33780 175800 136400 
Hourly wage 18.61 13.07 18.75 22.08 
AIME 28180 17060 30620 31790 
Initial Preference 0.4202 0.3789 0.3849 0.5029 
# of observations 1097 227 530 340 
     
     
Table 8: 
Parameter Values of Wage and Medical Cost Innovations 
     
Variables 𝜌𝑤 𝜎𝑤 𝜌𝑚𝑐 𝜎𝑚𝑐 
Value 0.977 0.12 0.925 2.278 
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 ln *ln ( , )t t t i tW Hours f Age Health        (18) 
where   is the inverse labor supply elasticity, t  is an individual fix effect and t  is an AR(1) 
error term. We use the inverse labor supply elasticity value from Aaronson and French (2004): 
0.412  , which implies "work more and earn more." By using (ln *ln )t tW Hours , wage 
profiles are not different between full-time and part-time jobs. The first two columns of Table 8 
are the calibrations of wage innovations from French (2005)9. Time correlation is a nearly unit 
root process, which is not surprising because the uncertainty of wage for elderly is quite low 
when approaching the end of their working career. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Retirement is not a one-time decision. The dynamic pattern of job transitions can still 
cause real wage changes. In the forward-looking model, if working agents know that they will 
face a decrease in wages or have difficulty finding a job after retiring, they may postpone their 
retirement. On the other hand, social pensions and private pensions may trigger an incentive to 
stop working. Computational resources do not allow inclusion of those situations in our model. A 
study by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) using low-income households that includes the 
effects of job tenure on the wage does these situations into account. 
Medical Costs and Insurance Types 
Medical costs are the sum of the various medical expenditures in the Rand HRS and the 
insurance premia in the core file. In our model they depend on four control variables: age, health, 
labor force status and insurance type. Except for updating the estimation of dynamic medical 
                                                          
9 Altonji, Smith, and Vadingos (2013) systematically studies the trends of earnings, employment, job changes, wage rates, and 
work hours over a career. However, I do not include education, occupation and aggregation shocks on wage. Stratifying the 
samples could mitigate the bias but limit the sample size. 
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costs with our data, we again follow the method of French and Jones (2011). Following French 
and Jones (2011), there are three insurance types in our model: no insurance, job-tied insurance, 
and retiree-coverage insurance.10 Insurance type is not chosen directly. When an agent leaves the 
labor force, his insurance type becomes no insurance. Moreover, only job-tied agents can 
experience an insurance transition in our model; in other words, the no-insurance type is an 
absorbing state, as is the retiree-coverage insurance type. 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
Figure 6 shows the exit rate by insurance type for ages 59 to age 68. The first peak occurs 
at age 62 for all insurance types. Unlike in previous studies, retiree-coverage insurance has the 
second transition peak at normal retirement age. Agents of the no-insurance type are more likely 
to retire at Medicare age 65. The likelihood is lower than the corresponding likelihood at early 
retirement age. There is no peak at either age for job-tied insurance. However, as expected, the 
exit rate from job-tied insurance increases monotonically with age. Insurance-type exit rates 
contribute to the moment conditions. 
Medical costs follow a first-order moving-average (MA(1)) process, the variance and 
mean for which are calibrated using French and Jones (2011)11. Estimation across the twelve 
combinations (four control variables times three insurance types) are performed using data from 
waves 4 through 12 of the HRS using MSM. 30 moments and 30 quantiles are matched. 
                                                          
10 Current insurance type is determined by respondent answers to the following questions: 1) whether respondent has employer-
provided insurance; 2) if yes, whether this insurance covers retirement. Additional information can be used to determine whether 
there is retiree-coverage insurance. Veteran benefits and a combination of employer-provided plus spousal insurance are assumed 
to imply retiree-coverage insurance. The retiree-coverage state is assumed to be absorbing because employers may be reluctant to 
hire retirees who ask for insurance benefits. 
11 The last two columns of Table 8 gives the value of the time correlation and variance of medical cost generating process. 
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Figure 6: 
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Housing 
Housing wealth plays the most important role in our study. For a study that forecasts 
local housing price changes based on a vector-autoregressive model, which takes into account 
local drivers such as population growth, unemployment rate and average income, see Follain and 
Giertz (2016). To minimize the number of state variables in the dynamic programming model, 
we assume a national housing market. The housing-wealth generating process is given by: 
 1 (1 )*(1 )*exp( )t t t tH g h        (19) 
where th  is the log of housing wealth, tg  is the housing price growth rate,   is the depreciation 
rate, and t  is the i.i.d. innovation to housing wealth. The growth rate, tg , is taken from the 
FHFA national housing price index for the years 2003 through 2014. For years beyond 2014, tg  
is set to 0.03. Respondents experience the housing boom and bust at different ages. To save 
computational resources in the calculation, we assume all agents were born in the year 1943, 
which is the average birth year in our sample. 
Social Security Benefits and AIME 
Social Security benefits calculation depends on the primary insurance amount (PIA), 
which is in turn determined by the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The AIME is the 
average of the 35 years of highest earnings deflated by the national wage index. It is updated 
each year that the earned wage is higher than the lowest previous one. It is not feasible to 
consider the employment history of each respondent. Instead, the AIME is imputed using a 
regression to obtain the ratio, t  , of the lowest wage to the AIME between the ages of 55 and 
70. The national wage growth rate is used to calibrate AIME growth before the age of 60, which 
is the last age indexed the national wage index. The structural model uses annual wages instead 
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of earnings. Hence, the ratio of lowest wage to AIME is predicted using the method of French 
and Jones (2011). Thus, the following calculation is used in the model: 
 
 
1 (1 * ( 60)*
1
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t t
t t t
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
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  
  (20) 
where   is the average wage growth rate, 0.016, from 2000 Green Book. 
Pension Benefits 
    We assume that all pension plans in the model are defined benefits plans, even though 
defined contribution plans have become more common recently. A defined contribution plan is 
riskier than a defined benefits plan. The elderlies also are likely to have experienced a large loss 
in their defined contribution balance during the Great Recession, which would provide another 
incentive for the elderly to delay retirement. The determinants of pension benefits in our model 
are age and the PIA. Hence, working one more year increases not only Social Security benefits, 
but also pension benefits in our model. 
The pension updating model is given by: 
  1
1
1
* 1 *
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t t t t
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s


     
  (21) 
where tPW  is pension wealth, ts  is the probability of living one more year, r  is the rate of 
return, tPacc  is the pension accrual amount from working one more year, and tps  is the level of 
collected pension benefits. The initial value of PW  is taken from the data provided by Gustman 
and Steinmeier (2014), while the pension accrual rate profile that provides values of tPacc  and 
the coefficients necessary to compute the values of tps  are taken from French and Jones (2011). 
62 
 
 
 
Even though we have the values of tps , adding these values as a new state variable is 
computationally prohibitive, so we use the PIA, which is already a state variable to impute the 
values of tps  when we estimate the structural model. 
Spousal Income 
Spousal income is a linear function of the first four powers of the male's age, health 
status, and interaction of the powers of his age with his health status. Spousal income is the sum 
of earnings, Social Security benefits, and pension benefits. We assume that the spouse will not 
die before the husband. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
Spousal income profile estimations use the entire sample in the HRS. For single males, 
spousal income is zero. The curvature of spousal income presented in Figure 7 seems reasonable. 
The spousal income curve for a healthy husband is higher than the curve for an unhealthy one. 
After the peak at the male age of 58, both curves decline. 
Health Transition and Mortality 
The estimation of health status transition uses a logit model, with the first three powers of 
the male's age, and interaction of the powers of his age with his lagged health status. Because 
HRS is a biannual survey, the lagged health status is from two years before. We assume the same 
health transition Markov matrix in the non-survey year as in the survey year. In Figure 8, the 
probabilities of bad health increase monotonically with age. Bad-to-bad health probabilities are 
time-persistent. The mortality estimation uses the same functional form and explanatory 
variables as the health transition estimation. The results presented in Figure 9 indicate the 
mortality of unhealthy males is higher than that of healthy ones. 
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Figure 7: 
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[Insert Figures 8 and 9 here] 
Types of Heterogeneity 
The heterogeneity definition of French and Jones (2011) is only available for the first 
wave in the HRS. Our initial wave is the fourth wave. We experiment with three definitions of 
heterogeneity: prefer to save, strong bequest motive, and more likely to work after age 62 and 
age 65. The first definition has a low response rate and the second turns out to be uninformative. 
The third definition uses survey questions of "Probability of working after age 62" and 
"Probability of working after age 65". The two types are defined by the sum of the two 
probabilities, greater than one (Type 1 heterogeneity) and less than or equal to one (Type 2 
heterogeneity). We use the first value that appears in the HRS as our definition of heterogeneity 
types. Hence, the structural model has two sets of consumption weights and discount rates. 
Re-Entry Status 
The purpose of the re-entry status is to account for the fact that retirees are less likely to 
re-enter the labor force when they get older and unhealthier. If we do not use re-entry status, 
retirees are more likely to seek jobs when the earnings test is eliminated after normal retirement 
age. In this case, the model shows an incorrect trend for labor participation at age 66. The 
estimation generating re-entry status is similar to the mortality estimation. Figure 10 presents the 
estimated unconditional (not restricted to currently being retired) re-entry rate by health status 
for the entire sample. It declines across age and unhealthy retirees are less likely to re-enter. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
Moment Conditions and Numerical Methods 
The estimation method is minimum distance estimation. The objective is to find the 
preference vector minimizing the following function: 
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Figure 8: 
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Figure 9: 
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Figure 10: 
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where I  is the number of individuals in the sample,   is the ratio of simulated to observed 
samples,   is the distance between simulated and observed moments, and W  is weighting 
matrix. 0  is the set of beliefs, discussed in the section immediately above. We use the variance-
covariance matrix of the observed data as the weighting matrix. The weighting matrix does not 
change within the estimation Moments are from ages 58 to 69. The moment conditions are: 
• First and second asset terciles by age to capture the saving behavior and 
the effect of housing wealth on the consumption. 
• Labor-force participation hazard moments by age and insurance type to 
capture the effect of Social Security and Medicare on the labor-force participation 
decision. 
• Labor-force participation rates conditional on asset terciles and insurance 
type. 
• Labor-force participation rates conditional on heterogeneity type. 
• Log of working hours and labor-force participation rates conditional on 
health status. 
In total, there are 240-moment conditions that need to be matched. Because of the 
existence of working decisions and government transfers, the Euler equation for consumption 
has multiple interior solutions. Solving and coding the Euler equations is extremely complicated. 
Instead of computing solutions to these equations, we use grid search (policy function iteration) 
to approximate the optimal solutions for consumption, working hours, and Social Security 
application. Coarse discretization may induce computational errors and enlarge estimation bias. 
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In the model, we assume that all individuals must apply for Social Security by age 70 and to 
retire after age 7212. 
We discretize continuous state variables: wage innovation, housing innovation, AIME, 
housing wealth, and non-housing wealth. We use five-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature for wage 
and housing innovations, ten-point AIME, and five-point housing, and ten-point non-housing 
wealth. We do not discretize uniformly. We use more points for the lower levels of the housing 
and non-housing wealth distributions to control for wealth concentration. Because of the fixed 
cost of work and the re-entry cost, the valuation function is not globally concave. Besides the 
larger grids for consumption, we also use nearest-neighbor search to look for the optimal 
consumption decision. We recognize that grid selection and fineness of discretization may affect 
the final results significantly. We use Tauchen's (1986) method to generate the Markov transition 
matrix for wage and medical cost innovation. 
Backward induction is used to solve the optimal decision at each age. Then, I use 
interpolation and extrapolation to impute the decisions of simulated households from the initial 
age to the final age. With the solutions of non-housing wealth and labor-force status, we can 
construct the simulated moments and evaluate the criterion function of MSM. 
As Victor Aguirregabiria (2011) says, substantial computing burden is due to repeat 
solving dynamic programming whenever parameters change. Even though we use OpenMP 
parallelization, each iteration takes about two and a half hours. An approximation method for 
dynamic programming is not possible because there is no consumption information in the HRS. 
                                                          
12 Postponing the mandatory retirement age helps smooth the labor-force participation trend between ages 59 and 69, but 
significantly increases computation time. 
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Another curse of dimensionality comes from the parameters set. We have 14 parameters to 
estimate, which increases the convergence time. Therefore, we use the simplex method. 
Estimation Results and Model Fitness 
Table 9 presents the estimation results for the original model. Consumption weights are 
similar across heterogeneity types. Agents unlikely to work past ages 62 and 65 have a 
significantly lower discount rate than their counterparts. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that agents who initially say they will not work in the future may in fact prefer to do so. The 
estimate of the bequest curvature indicates bequest is a luxury good. The fixed costs of bad 
health and working are positive, which is consistent with our expectations. The consumption 
floor is nearly 4600 dollars. Because of the large number of moments, the over-identification test 
is rejected in all estimations. However, the simulated decision profiles are close to the observed 
counterparts. We discuss some of the differences between simulated and observed decisions. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Figure 11 shows the differences for non-housing wealth quantiles. French and Jones 
(2011) combine housing and non-housing wealth in total assets and find saving occurs in 
wealthier households. After separating housing and non-housing wealth, agents in the higher 
quantiles for non-housing wealth reduce saving from the age of 60 to 65. During the calendar 
period of our sample, housing wealth is booming, and consumption tends to increase. It is not 
surprising to find the decline for non-housing wealth in the model. When the housing market 
enters the bust period, agents switch to a saving mode. However, the match quality of the non-
housing wealth quantile moments is weak. There are two potential reasons for this. First, many 
households in the higher quantiles of non-housing wealth also have a significant amount of 
housing wealth. The wealth effect of housing price increases contributes to a dramatically  
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Table 9: 
Original Model Results 
   
Variables Estimates Std.Err 
Discount rate (type 0) 0.6715 0.0096 
Discount rate (type 1) 0.9986 0.0066 
Consumption weight (type 0) 0.5272 0.0065 
Consumption weight (type 1) 0.5788 0.0064 
Risk aversion 2.655 0.0534 
Leisure endowment (*1000) 4.636 0.4707 
Bequest Curvature (*100000) 4.634 0.0478 
Propensity of bequest (%) 10.64 0.7929 
Fix cost of bad health (*100) 4.462 0.1877 
Fix cost of working (*100) 1.747 0.0635 
Age effects of working (*10) 0.808 0.0533 
Fix cost of reentry (*100) 1.563 0.2077 
Consumption floor (*1000) 3.284 0.0710 
Housing proportion rate 0.252 0.0106 
Over-identification test= 3732  
Degrees of Freedom 206  
P value <0.001  
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increased level of consumption, resulting in further declines of non-housing wealth. The second 
reason is the collateral constraint and debt. If households are extremely risk-averse, they avoid 
borrowing against housing wealth. The modified model does better in fitting saving behavior. 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
Figures 12 and 13 show both the unconditional labor-force participation rate and the rate 
conditional on health status. The rates decrease with age in both graphs. The largest 
improvement because of the addition of re-entry status in our model is the absence of an upward 
movement of the labor-force participation rate at the normal retirement age. However, the hazard 
rate is underestimated at the early retirement age, which leads to the higher exit rates after 
normal retirement age in Figure 8. This is possibly because of the approximation of the AIME 
and coarse discretization of non-housing wealth. (There are only 10 discretizations.) We cannot 
identify whether it reflects the liquidity constraint is binding for most of the households. The 
liquidity constraint is key to increasing the exit rate at early retirement age. The approximate 
mean level of the AIME used in our model is 20 percent lower for those respondents for which 
the actual level is known in the restricted data. On the other hand, the modeling of the re-entry 
status may be too simple. If agents expect they will not re-enter the labor market after retirement, 
they are reluctant to retire earlier. Figure 14 is the labor-force participation profile from the 
modified model. Although the bias is smaller, our estimates still slightly overestimate between 
the ages of 62 and 65 and slightly underestimate after age 65. 
[Insert Figures 12, 13 and 14 here] 
Figures 15 shows the labor-force exit rates. The simulated exit rate at the early retirement 
age is about seven percent, which is only half of the sample mean. Figures 16, 17, and 18 show  
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Figure 11: Non-housing Wealth Quantiles, Data versus Simulations 
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Figure 12: Labor Conditional on Health, Data versus Simulations 
  
75 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Labor, Data versus Simulations 
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Figure 14: Labor, Data versus Simulations, extension 
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the labor-force participation rates across different insurance types. The model underestimates the 
labor-force participation rate at younger ages for the no-insurance group. There is overestimation 
for the retiree-coverage insurance group. The simulated curve rotates to the right around age 64. 
To examine the reasons, I would have to use se the AIME from the restricted data on the high-
performance computer, which is not possible. The level of saving during the bust is smaller than 
the use of non-housing wealth during the boom in the original but not in the modified model. 
After obtaining government transfers payments, agents are locked into social welfare programs. 
When the proportion of "free ride" agents increases, savings behavior becomes weaker. 
[Insert Figures 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 here] 
Table 10 presents the estimation results from the modified model with the collateral 
constraint. There are three important differences between the original and modified models. 
First, the risk- aversion coefficient nearly doubles from 2.6 in the original model to 5.3 in the 
modified model, so that the results for saving behavior improve (see Figure 19) The reason the 
simulated second tercile for non-housing wealth becomes flat is perhaps a result of the high exit 
rate at age 65 with subsequent loss of wages. Second, the bequest motive propensity change. In 
the modified model, households are more inclined to leave a bequest. Third, the consumption 
floor nearly doubles in the modified model. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Robustness Check 
Table 11 presents the estimates without housing wealth. The coefficients do not change 
when we use non-housing wealth moments in our model fitness criteria, compared to when we 
use total wealth. There are four differences compared to the original model. First, the discount  
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Figure 15: Job Exit, Data versus Simulations 
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Figure 16: Labor of None, Data versus Simulations 
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Figure 17: Labor of Retiree, Data versus Simulations 
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Figure 18: Labor of Tied, Data versus Simulations 
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Figure 19: Non-housing Wealth Quantiles, Data versus Simulations, Modified 
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Table 10: 
Modified Model Results 
   
Variables Estimates Std.Err 
Discount rate (type 0) 1.0699 0.0119 
Discount rate (type 1) 0.9100 0.0129 
Consumption weight (type 0) 0.5439 0.0121 
Consumption weight (type 1) 0.6892 0.0131 
Risk aversion 5.3710 0.1627 
Leisure endowment (*1000) 3.8391 0.0816 
Bequest Curvature (*100000) 4.2322 0.3180 
Propensity of bequest (%) 5.0479 0.2064 
Fix cost of bad health (*100) 4.8031 0.4043 
Fix cost of working (*100) 1.6459 0.1318 
Age effects of working (*10) 0.8604 0.1055 
Fix cost of reentry (*100) 1.6524 0.5641 
Consumption floor (*1000) 6.2219 0.2134 
Housing proportion rate 0 **** 
Over-identification test= 1625.6  
Degrees of Freedom 207  
P value <0.001  
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rates for Type 1 heterogeneity and Type 2 heterogeneity switch. Type 2 agents become more 
patient than Type 1 agents. The original model results indicate that Type 1 agents are patient and 
work in order to save. On the contrary, now in the robustness check, Type 1 agents are impatient 
and work in order to consume. Second, the risk-aversion coefficient increases to nearly 5. 
Housing is an insurance mechanism. If there were no precautionary saving through housing 
wealth accumulation, the elderly would be more risk averse. Third, the bequest motive curvature 
increases by nearly $110,000. By coincidence, the gap is the mean of housing wealth. Excluding 
housing wealth makes the bequest motive more of a luxury good. Fourth, the estimate of the 
consumption floor in the robustness check is approximately $5,000, which is similar to that of 
French and Jones (2011). The saving behavior for the higher tercile appears in Figure 20. 
[Insert Table 11 and Figure 20 here] 
Table 12 presents the estimates from a specification without housing wealth and 
heterogeneity types. The estimation excludes housing wealth from the asset accumulation 
function and uses the total wealth moments, in order to compare the results to those of French 
and Jones (2011). The bequest motive is strong as well. Risk aversion increases and the bequest 
propensity decreases. In our second robustness check, the bequest motive is even stronger than in 
the results of the original model and the robustness check with heterogeneity. The leisure 
endowment and all time costs decrease, and the consumption weight is higher than in the other 
two results. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
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Table 11: 
Robustness Check, Without Housing Wealth 
   
Variables Estimates Std.Err 
Discount rate (type 0) 1.012 0.0097 
Discount rate (type 1) 0.5376 0.0153 
Consumption weight (type 0) 0.4623 0.0076 
Consumption weight (type 1) 0.5581 0.0073 
Risk aversion 4.964 0.1351 
Leisure endowment (*1000) 4.581 0.0642 
Bequest Curvature (*100000) 5.766 0.5706 
Propensity of bequest (%) 13.20 1.1570 
Fix cost of bad health (*100) 7.086 0.2846 
Fix cost of working (*100) 1.220 0.0311 
Age effects of working (*10) 0.4583 0.0390 
Fix cost of reentry (*100) 2.368 0.1675 
Consumption floor (*1000) 4.911 0.0648 
Housing proportion rate 0 **** 
Over-identification test= 2580  
Degrees of Freedom 207  
P value <0.001  
  
86 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Non-housing Wealth Quantiles, Data versus Simulations, Robust 
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Table 12: 
Robustness Check, Without Housing Wealth and Heterogeneity 
   
Variables Estimates Std.Err 
Discount rate  0.843 0.0123 
Consumption weight  0.592 0.0069 
Risk aversion 7.943 0.2118 
Leisure endowment (*1000) 3.497 0.0555 
Bequest Curvature (*100000) 5.536 0.2299 
Propensity of bequest (%) 2.074 0.0524 
Fix cost of bad health (*100) 5.189 0.1764 
Fix cost of working (*100) 2.642 0.1037 
Age effects of working (*10) 1.133 0.0814 
Fix cost of reentry (*100) 0.888 0.1137 
Consumption floor (*1000) 4.551 0.1061 
Housing proportion rate 0 **** 
Over-identification test= 2003  
Degrees of Freedom 187  
P value <0.001  
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Counterfactual Experiments 
The counterfactual experiments examine different housing price expectations and tighter 
borrowing constraints. The first counterfactual experiment examines what happens when the 
return on housing wealth is fixed at its long-run level of 3 percent annually. Note that both 
original and modified models use the actual HPI. The second experiment examines what happens 
in the absence of a housing bust. We use the long-run housing growth rate after the year 2008 
(average age of 66). The third experiment examines the effect of a tighter borrowing constraint 
from home equity. The new equity line is 50 percent of home value, which represents a decrease 
from the 75 percent level in the modified model. 
[Insert Figures 21, 22 and 23 here] 
Because the modified model results best match the actual saving behavior, the 
counterfactual experiments are based on the estimation results from Table 10. Figures 21 through 
23 show the observed working profile, the simulated working profile from the original model 
and the simulated working profile from the modified model across the non-housing wealth 
terciles. The original model uses housing wealth change as a potential financial resource and 
does not allow the households to borrow. Hence, households with limited non-housing wealth 
who expect a decline in housing wealth may return to the labor market. The reason that the 
original model shows that the households with higher levels of non-housing wealth re-enter the 
labor market at age 62 maybe because of the underestimation of the labor-force participation rate 
before this age. In the modified model, we fit declining rates of labor-force participation well, 
except for households with low levels of non-housing wealth. In the observed data, there is no 
large decrease in labor-force participation rates either at Medicare age and normal retirement 
age. Perhaps, this is because of the substantial loss of housing wealth for wealthy households  
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Figure 21: Labor Participation Rate, Data, Non-housing Wealth Quantile 
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Figure 22: Labor Participation Rate, Original Model, Non-housing Wealth Quantile 
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Figure 23: Labor Participation Rate, Modified Model, Non-housing Wealth Quantile 
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after the housing bust and the limited borrowing ability of poorer households. Moreover, the 
declining labor-force participation rate reverses at age 67 among households in the second tercile 
for non-housing wealth. Our original and modified models cannot capture this phenomenon. 
[Insert Table 13 and Figure 24 here] 
Table 13 presents the summary from the simulations. There is only a 1 percent change in 
the average labor-force participation rate in experiment 1. It is reasonable that the average HPI 
from the year 2000 to 2014 is three percent, which is close to the long-run growth rate. However, 
Figure 24 shows that the retirement profile is quite different in the low asset quantile. When the 
housing price return is high, the working rate is nearly ten percent lower in the modified model 
than in experiment 1 at age 59. When the housing bust begins, the declining trend of labor 
participation is much flatter in experiment 1 than in the modified model after the age of 64. The 
two different assumptions on HPI expectation do not lead to large differences for wealthy 
households. 
[Insert Figure 25 here] 
In experiment 2, if households do not expect a housing bust, the average labor-force 
participation rate is 5 percent lower than the estimation results. The largest effects are for 
households with the lower two terciles of non-housing wealth. In Figure 25, their labor-force 
participation profiles can be seen to shift downward. It reconfirms that housing price declines 
mainly affect households at the borrowing margin. 
[Insert Figure 26 here] 
There is a 2 percent increase of the labor-force participation rate in experiment 3, where 
we decrease the level of the home-equity line. The tighter borrowing limit acts similarly to a  
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Table 13: 
Labor-force Participation Profiles: Modified Model and Experiments 
 
Age Modified Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
59 0.7126 0.7360 0.6598 0.7119 
60 0.6924 0.7066 0.6335 0.6958 
61 0.6614 0.6634 0.5926 0.6661 
62 0.6209 0.6086 0.5494 0.6283 
63 0.5808 0.5509 0.5097 0.5927 
64 0.5366 0.4941 0.4699 0.5522 
65 0.4489 0.4004 0.3841 0.4690 
66 0.3925 0.3554 0.3429 0.4151 
67 0.3511 0.3240 0.3137 0.3741 
68 0.3156 0.2988 0.2910 0.3371 
69 0.2805 0.2764 0.2704 0.2961 
Avg. 0.5084 0.4922 0.4561 0.5217 
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Figure 24: Labor Participation Rate, Experiment 1, Non-housing Wealth Quantile 
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Figure 25: Labor Participation Rate, Experiment 2, Non-housing Wealth Quantile 
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Figure 26: Labor Participation Rate, Experiment 3, Non-housing Wealth Quantile 
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decrease in housing wealth. The increase in the overall labor-force participation rate stems from 
increased participation rates for males in the lower two terciles of non-housing wealth. In Figure 
21, the labor-force participation trends for males in these quartiles become flatter, while rates for 
males in the top tercile remain nearly unchanged. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Several recent studies have examined durable and non-durable consumption in the 
context of a life-cycle model. Aaronson, Agarwal and French (2012) conclude that housing 
wealth changes affect the debt levels of poorer households. This is consistent with the finding in 
this paper that the non-housing wealth accumulation profile is significantly different when 
housing is included as an illiquid asset. During housing boom-bust periods, most loans are 
originated to extract cash, by refinancing an existing mortgage loan into a larger mortgage loan 
(Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011). Extracted cash can finance consumption or invest in the 
financial market (Cocco 2004). Most of the studies do not focus on the elderly (Aaronson, 
Agarwal, and French 2012, Cocco 2004, and Yang 2009). The role of the effect of home equity 
on elderly labor-force participation needs further investigation. 
Both original and modified models fit labor-force participation well and the modified 
model fits non-housing wealth accumulation closely. Including housing wealth in the model 
significantly affects the savings behavior of wealthy households. The change of housing wealth 
affect labor-force attachment through the different channels, specifically, consumption, the 
bequest motive, and precautionary savings. if the elderly expect the decline in housing wealth, 
they may postpone retirement to secure their future living standards in the face of possible 
adverse outcomes. In the original model, consumption Increases due to increases in housing 
wealth induces declines in non-housing wealth accumulation for males in their early 60's, and 
98 
 
 
 
social welfare programs disincentivize saving in poorer households. Therefore, declines in non-
housing wealth accumulation lead to smaller bequests in the original model. In the modified 
model, concerns regarding debt increaser saving and the bequest motive becomes stronger. 
We introduce a new state variable, potential re-entry status that blocks a large re-entry 
rate at the normal retirement age due to the elimination of the Social Security earnings at that 
age. The probability of re-entry decreases with age and unhealthy males are unlikely to re-enter 
the labor market. The coefficient of housing wealth in the original model is estimated to be close 
to the ratio of mortgage to home value in the sample. This suggests that an equity line of credit 
collateralized by housing wealth is one of the leading factors affecting consumption and saving. 
Our experiments examine how results would change when 1) households expect HPI to 
increase at its long-run value of 3 percent, 2) there is no housing-bust episode and 3) there is a 
tight borrowing constraint. In the first experiment, the labor-force participation choices of 
households change significantly across non-housing wealth terciles, even though the change in 
average labor-force participation is small. In the second experiment, where there is no housing 
bust, the average of labor-force participation rate decreases by almost 5 percent and households 
at the borrowing margin are strongly affected compared to the modified model. In the third 
experiment, the effect of a tighter borrowing constraint will increase the average labor-force 
participation rate by 2 percent. In summary, the three experiments suggest that decreasing 
housing wealth and tighter borrowing constraints will delay retirement, particularly for 
households with little liquid assets. 
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